ANARCHY 95

Yugoslavia: is it workers control?

TWO SHILLINGS OR THIRTY CENTS
Yugoslavia: is it workers' control?

In SPITE OF THE PLATITUDES about our shrinking world and the assumptions that modern transport and modern communications have brought the whole world to our doorsteps, it is as hard for us to evaluate and understand the social and political realities of certain countries as it ever was. In fact it is probably harder. What is "the truth" about China, or about Cuba, or about Yugoslavia? Everything you are told about these countries has to be weighed against what you know of the ideological bias or prejudice, or the gullibility or perceptiveness of your informant. Ask a Communist to interpret for you the events of the last few years in China, and his answer will depend on his affiliations. Ask an anarchist his interpretation of the evolution of Castro's Cuba, and you will get a variety of conflicting answers, as the participants in the international anarchist congress at Carrara found last summer.

This is probably the reason why so little attempt has been made in the English-speaking world to evaluate developments in Yugoslavia from an anarchist point of view. Yugoslavia may be the most "free" of the East European countries, but this freedom has very narrowly prescribed limits, as Mihajlo Mihajlov could testify, if he were not in jail. Nevertheless, the official ideology has many aspects borrowed from anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism, even though anarchism is not a point of view which can be safely discussed, let alone propagated, in that country.

When, at the height of Stalin's power, Tito defied him, and got away with it, the Yugoslav Communist intellectuals, looking for ideological differences to justify "National Communism", took up the cry Back to Lenin, and then, seeking in their precarious situation, support first from the opposition (i.e. workers and peasants) in Yugoslavia, and then from the social democratic parties of the West, made concessions — ending of forced collectivisation, a market economy, workers' councils of a sort.

The initial change in Yugoslavia (apart from the later concessions to peasant resistance) was not a revolt against a social system or a political ideology, it was, as Irving Howe has noted, "designed to modify a relationship of power" between the local Communist leader-
ship and the Russian leadership. Milovan Djilas himself, Tito's propaganda boss at the time, emphasised this in an article in the American New Leader (19.11.56) which won him a cell in the Mitrovica jail:

"Yugoslav national Communism was, above all, the resistance to Moscow of the Communist party, that is, of its leaders. Not that the people opposed this resistance, not that they did not support it and benefit from it—quite the contrary. But the interests and the initiative of the leaders played a crucial and leading role . . . in Yugoslavia, therefore, the entire process was led and carefully controlled from above. . . ."

In his study of Tito, The Triumphant Heretic, Ernst Halperin observed that "the Yugoslav system, launched by its inventors as undiluted Marxism-Leninism, is in reality no longer Marxist" and he asks from what source did the Yugoslav conception come?

"The Titoist watchwords, 'The Factories for the Workers!' and 'Direction of Production through the Producers!' belong to the mental armory of the anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists.

"Ever since Proudhon and Bakunin, an anarchist current has run through the Labour movement—at first as a mighty river out in the open, later, after being dammed and diverted by the Marxists, as a strong subterranean stream. Anarchists in the strict sense have been reduced to small, insignificant groups, except in Spain. Their teachings have been driven from the consciousness of the working-class movement, but they live on in the subconscious; often those who harbour them take them for the purest orthodox Marxism. . . ."

"In 1918 and 1919 numerous small groups of anarchists and nearly the whole anarcho-syndicalist wing of the trade-union movement flocked to Communism, and lent force to the storm then raging over Europe.

"Is it then, impossible that today, at a time when the socialist labour movement of Europe appears to be prey to a hopeless stagnation, a new powerful impetus should be given to it by the extreme left, through a revival of anarchist ideas?"

Halperin hastened to point out, as we would ourselves, that there are immense differences between the theory of anarcho-syndicalism and the practice of Titoism: "The anarchists want to abolish money; in Titoist Yugoslavia the monetary system is in full force. Anarchism stands opposed to a regular army; Yugoslavia has a very strong army. Anarchists loathe the police power; Tito's regime has a strong police force complete with a ubiquitous organisation of informers. . . . Anarchism, however, is a vehemently anti-authoritarian, libertarian doctrine. By contrast, nothing more authoritarian can be imagined than a Communist party with its thought discipline and its use of intellectual and physical terror in dealing with the world outside its ranks. The dictatorship of the totalitarian party, and even the very existence of such a party, is incompatible with the anarchist or anarcho-syndicalist social order. In the Titoist system, based, as it is, on anarcho-syndicalist principles, the Party represents an alien body. In practice, the presence of that alien body has paralysed the whole system."

Halperin was writing ten years ago. Has the situation changed much since then? It depends who you listen to. The Guardian, in a leading article on June 11th, 1968, declared that, "Much has already been achieved in the two years since Alexander Rankovic was dismissed from the Ministry of the Interior and work began on dismantling the secret police—'the force of whose authority has made everyone's blood freeze', in the words of the party organ Komunist. So long as Rankovic represented a State within a State, the workers' control to which so much effort has been devoted remained partly a fiction. Now it is gaining vigour every week. Very soon Yugoslavia will have reached the position, if it has not been reached already, where the proletariat actually dictates. Representatives elected by the workers, not only in every factory but in every subdivision of a factory, assess, question, and either authorise or veto whatever the management proposes. Workers' control is still in many cases more apparent than real. It is also cumbersome and, by time-and-motion standards, inefficient; but some inefficiency is accepted as a price worth paying for the direct involvement of the people in the decisions affecting them."

The discussion of "self-management" in Yugoslavia in this issue of ANARCHY comes, not from an anarchist, but from a socialist, David Riddell, who is a more severe critic than the Guardian of the Yugoslav regime, from a point of view close to our own. He wrote last summer, for instance, that, "For nearly twenty years the watchwords in Yugoslavia have been Self-government and Self-management. The march towards the ideal of a new Socialist man is proclaimed everywhere you go. But the reality has been somewhat different. If real self-government was to be introduced it would at some stage threaten the position of the political leaders themselves. This was not to be tolerated. So every seemingly socialist measure tends to get hedged with restrictions that weaken it, and cynicism results. . . ."

"In economic terms, bureaucratic planning on the Soviet model has hardly a friend; but since a real democratisation of planning was ruled out, the alternative was reliance on the market—and as this has been allowed to develop, self-management of industry has become a struggle between firms. A struggle which favours rich and well-placed firms at the expense of others, and which has been complicated by attempts to make income differentials the main stimulus to work."

Yugoslavia is very far from being an anarchist society. The word "anarchist" is still used there as a term of abuse. (It was used by the Belgrade press to describe the demonstrating students there last June.) But anarchists, and everyone who is interested in the practical problems of evolving a system of "workers' control" whether in Communist dictatorships or capitalist plutocracies, can afford to learn from David Riddell's account of the Yugoslav experience.
Social self-government: theory and practice in Yugoslavia

DAVID RIDDLE

INTRODUCTION

YUGOSLAVIA HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF intermittent and sympathetic attention by British writers—mainly socialists—for some years now.2 Two general studies have been supplemented by a detailed description of the organization of workers' self-management in Yugoslav factories.3 Yet most of this material remains descriptive or impressionistic and a recent article on "Democracy and Workers' Control" dismissed the Yugoslav experience in a paragraph, arguing that, "Yugoslav assumptions . . . reduce the question of democratic control to one of an increasingly meaningless local autonomy, and gradually replaces a central conscious willed network of decisions by palpable and unseen economic pressures."4

What is the theoretical justification for Yugoslav socialism? How is it related to circumstance, and can it be reduced to meaningless trial and error? Are the social relationships being created in Yugoslavia "basis on which rests the achievement of a humanization of relationships between men, a humanization of labour, therefore the condition which will enable man to become, gradually, master of his destiny?"5 Or do they imply rather a "peaceful transition from socialism to capitalism"?6 A consideration of these questions involves an understanding of the particular difficulties of "transforming human nature" in a semi-developed, culturally disparate society with a large peasant minority.7 The present article relates some empirical research into the functioning of self-government in the political and economic orders to attitudes and behaviour derived from crucial features of the nation's socio-political development.

It can be cynically argued that the theory of socialism which has developed in Yugoslavia over the past sixteen years has been nothing more than an attempt to rationalize a political quarrel between Yugoslavia and the USSR.8 Alternatively, it has been asserted that Yugoslav practice is purely pragmatic. One study considers that since the Marxist ideology is so divorced from reality, "It is the mass of the hesitants, the waiting, the marginals, who should come to see the meaning of the Yugoslav experience, and rally to more sensible doctrines."9

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Yugoslav ideologists themselves tend to underplay the significance of the breach with the USSR. It was necessary after the war to have a period of "administrative" centralization to set the country going; the workers' councils already existed in embryonic form in the "consultative committees" of the immediate post-war years.9 Thus Kidric in 1951, "It must be stated today that the old system of production, in spite of all the avoidable errors, in spite of the fact that certain administrative methods were abandoned too late, was, all in all, indispensable in abolishing private capitalism, and lifting the material base of production to a degree necessary for building socialism in the country."10 And Dagonić in 1957, "Administrative control alone could solve the economic and political problems which presented themselves with the revolutionary victory. But when these problems were by and large, solved, administrative control began to become an obstacle to the more rapid and harmonious development of the forces of production and social relationships."11

In this view Yugoslav socialism has been an appropriate response to the general conditions which Yugoslavia faced at any period of time. None of these extreme positions seems to be quite correct.

Three kinds of influence on the developing Yugoslav revolution made the long continuance of the authoritarian centralist forms of Soviet society very unlikely. First, features of the general social background did not favour it.15 Second, like the Chinese, and in contrast to other East European states, the Yugoslav party had carried through a communist revolution largely independent of the Soviet Union. Thirdly, although the Yugoslav communists were orthodox in their subservience to Stalin, this subservience, because of the other two factors, was conditional, and this enabled them, when the break with the Soviet Union became inevitable, to re-appraise their own experience in the post-war years.

1. General social background

Yugoslav culture has been conditioned by the area's political position, as an undeveloped, poverty stricken peasant buffer between the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires.16 Changes in political boundary and administration were very frequent, as were local uprisings against alien impositions and barbarities, especially in the Turkish areas. Montenegro maintained a precarious independence through geographical inaccessibility and constant repulsion of attempted invasion; the system of blood revenge ensured the ferocity of the population and its constant military preparedness to repel attack from outside.14 In the circumstances, the Yugoslav peasant population—there were few towns, especially in the eastern part of the country—developed a deep distrust of central authority, and the political instability, coupled with the poor communications led to a great deal of local self-sufficiency. But within the family group, co-operation was extensive. Often an extended and compound family household, the Zadruga, developed, in which several generations of relatives might live and work together. This family system only recently declined, as trade and centralized administration
gradually broke down regional and local autonomy in the last part of the nineteenth century. The legacy of hostility to central authority, and traditional support of groups opposed to it undoubtedly helped the partisans in the Second World War; but the partisans, in their turn, became the central authority after the war.

If the general mistrust of government was common to most of the region that is now Yugoslavia, in other ways it was fragmented. Different languages and scripts made communication difficult. Religious differences were passionate and endemic—they coincided to some extent with acceptance or non-acceptance of Turkish rule, and with regional fears of Great Serbian expansionism. Thus in the Second World War, there was at some periods an uneasy alliance between the Catholic Ustase movement in Croatia, and Moslems in Bosnia against members of the Serbian Orthodox religion, and abominable excesses were committed. Also there was traditional rural hostility to the towns, which had harboured an artisan class subservient to the Turks, the Cincars, who, as Trouton says, “Represented the essence of all that countrymen everywhere hate in townsmen, and on their heads were concentrated all the feelings that in other countries produce peasant anti-semitism.” Levels of development were very uneven—Serbia reasonably prosperous, Macedonia with an almost Asian poverty. All in all, it must be agreed that this background was not propitious for an enduring centralism.

2. The Yugoslav communist party

Both major phases in the history of the communist party of Yugoslavia in the period before it came to power, the pre-war period, and the partisan period, reflect the social background and reinforce it. Communism took quick root in the developing industrial areas after the First World War. Industry consisted mainly of foreign-owned companies set up to exploit Yugoslavia’s mineral resources. Copper, for instance, was not processed in the country and had to be re-imported in refined form. Even such manufacturing industry as developed was often foreign owned. Such an industrial structure forms a classic recruiting ground for communism, and in the first elections of the new state, held in 1919, communist candidates won control of Zagreb and Belgrade councils, and took 58 seats in the national parliament, being, significantly, the only group to be elected on a non-regional basis. Already by the end of 1920, the party had been driven underground.

By the second party congress, factions had emerged—the main divisions being between gradualists and revolutionists. These were entangled with differences about the nationalities problem and policy in regard to the peasantry. Over and above this quarrels over leadership developed. There were divisions between Left Opposition supporters and Stalinists, and the Comintern regarded the Yugoslav party as an extremely fractious child. Tito came to the fore in the middle-thirties, and, with the help of purges, which removed many of the older leaders, was able to reorganize the party and to effect its central control by men supporting him. Although government persecution kept the party very small—with less than 2,000 members in the mid-thirties—it had much latent support, and by 1940 had increased twentyfold. There was not time before the war to educate and discipline this new membership into Stalinist centralism, however. In addition, the Yugoslav group of Spanish Civil War volunteers came under the influence of anarchist-syndicalist ideas, and, according to Bauer, “Doubtless the source of the Yugoslav anarcho-syndicalist outlook is to be found in Spain, and is a result of the participation of the Yugoslav members of the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War.”

This view is not accepted by Avukumovic, however. In these ways the pre-war phase of Yugoslav party history reflected and added its own dimension to the localization of Yugoslav society.

3. The communist revolution

The experience of the partisan movement, led and controlled by the communists, during the Second World War is quite well-known. Certain features of this period require emphasis. Firstly, the resistance took place almost entirely in rural areas. In terms of the peasant culture of Yugoslavia, the partisans formed part of a tradition of resistance to a mistrusted central authority. They also promised land reform and education, the latter traditionally seen as a means of peasant advancement. Thus, many peasants joined the movement. Secondly, although discipline in a resistance movement is usually extreme where it is enforceable, the very nature of the struggle, consisting largely of dispersed harassing actions on a local basis, with poor overall communications increases the autonomy of small groups, so that local leaders emerge. The problems this can bring have been illustrated recently in the factional struggles in Algeria. Neither of these features of the Partisan experience could be said to reinforce a position of extreme centralization of authority. Thirdly, although the leaders of the partisans were Stalin’s men, and looked to Moscow, as has often been pointed out, the fact that the partisans independently gained control of large parts of Yugoslavia put them in a potentially different relationship to Moscow than those leaders who owed their presence solely to the Red Army, as was the case in other East European countries. Indeed, the reluctance of the Russians to recognize this fact—by refusing urgent requests for aid, and recognizing the royalist emigré government in London for a time—must already have sown suppressed seeds of doubt. Also the aid given by Western governments during the war might be said to have established a precedent for later developments.

In summary, the cultural background, the early history of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and the war experience all militated against the permanent establishment of a centralized state on the Soviet model.

THE “ADMINISTRATIVE” PERIOD, 1945-50, AND THE BREAK WITH THE SOVIET UNION

As has already been shown, Yugoslav theorists argue, with varying depths of conviction, that the “administrative” period of centralized authority was a necessary one after the war. The country was in ruins; only Poland and the western part of the Soviet Union suffered more. Systematic atrocities had been conducted against the educated popula-
tion. Relations with the Western allies were cool because of quarrels over Trieste and the Yugoslav support of Greek partisans. But perhaps most importantly, the leadership saw the Soviet Union as the prototype socialist state.

Machinery for the preparation of a centralized plan was set up. Such industry as existed was quickly expropriated, as were large holdings of land. Vestiges of a multi-party system were quickly swept away, and a constitution modelled on that of the Soviet Union established. However, workers' consultative committees, with advisory status only, were established in some factories. Also, the communists did not collectivize agriculture, a reflection of the special relationship between partisans and peasants built up during the war. The fact that many of the new workers in expanding industry were still part peasant must have kept ideas of individual ownership and responsibility in the foreground of the consciousness of the new working class.

The new planners produced a massive central plan. Its aim was, with Soviet assistance, to industrialize the country in five years. 700 members of the Federal Planning Commission drew up the plan, which weighed approximately 14 tons. Production targets for between 16,000 and 20,000 commodities were set, in the minutest detail. A huge, partly semi-professional inspectorate dealt with the 600 to 800 reports that each enterprise had to submit annually. Although a basis of heavy industry was laid in this period, the inefficiency of such a system, its consequences in the creation of apathy at lower levels, and of a vast bureaucracy at the higher, together with the enormous financial drain of the cost of the staff on a backward country must be apparent.

Bicanic, a Yugoslav economist, has written, "The balancing of supply and demand in a centrally planned economy occurs in offices where a few people, unaware of the real effects of their authoritarian plans, become the supreme judges of the destinies of all producers and consumers through their bureaucratic machine. From this source of authority, plans lead further down to smaller bodies, splitting unrealistic averages into still smaller averages according to norms born in offices which, when they reach the enterprise level, have little resemblance to the conditions of actual life." And, "In 1947 the two biggest beaches on the Adriatic coast could only make one type of cake per day for all the restaurants, cafes, and cake shops and bakers. The control of one industry by one firm was realized as if in a treatise on Political Economy, but the cakes weren't very good. Today, the economies of large scale production are less, but the cakes are better."

Other features of the administrative period were: highly developed political and trade union bureaucracy, the former at least receiving material and financial privileges in the form of better rations, housing and perks than the rest of the population and a powerful and, by all accounts, much hated secret police, UDBA.

Not only was such a system in conflict with attitudes derived from Yugoslavia's cultural history, but it led to normative conflicts within the leadership itself, between the "Partisan ethic"—the stern morality and idealism that sustained the wartime guerilla fighting, and the Stalinist dogmatism deriving from political socialization in the Comintern of the 1930's. The interplay of these two normative orientations in the leadership can be traced through the whole development of Yugoslavia since this period.

According to an "official" Yugoslav account, the causes of the break with the Soviet Union were Soviet economic and political domination, with other East European countries, the Soviet Union tried to impose joint stock companies that were very unfair to the Yugoslavs; did not pay world prices for Yugoslav goods, and overcharged for their own; some units of the Red Army behaved like conquerors and demanded privileges; and the Soviet party tried to develop its own system of contacts and channels of influence in Yugoslavia. The independent Yugoslav party leadership, already doubtful about the amount of help received from the Soviet Union in the war, could not accept such a situation calmly, and irritation grew on both sides over a period. The initial effect on internal policy was to tighten centralism; observers have characterized the 1948-9 period as more "Stalinist than the Stalinists." Agriculture was collectivized. But within the central committee there was "agonized reappraisal", centred especially around Djilas. There was, in fact, another stream of Marxism, with which many of the Yugoslav leaders were familiar. Delean, in one of the most useful statements of the theory of Yugoslav socialism, suggests that there were a range of background influences, in the ephemeral but very rich experience of the Paris Commune, in the gropings of anarchist organizations everywhere in Europe towards the end of the last century, in the eclectic and inconsequent essays of Kautsky, Bauer and Adler; in the first miners' committees of the First World War in many industrial countries; in the Whitley councils, the shop stewards committees, the undertaking and works councils, the factory committees, the "workers' Soviets" and workers' supervisory committees during the early years of Soviet rule; in the organs set up during the German uprising and inspired by the October revolution; in the workers' committees of Brel Kun's Soviet Hungary; in the first Austrian Undertaking Councils Act immediately after the First World War; in numerous speeches by Lenin in which he foretold the need for workers to take a part in direct decisions and to be prepared for workers' management; during the occupation of the factories by Italian workers in the twenties of this century; in the revolutionary experience acquired during the Spanish Civil War in factory management...

It was not these ideas themselves which led to the split; but the split which led to reconsideration of these ideas. The result was the same. Tadic wrote in 1957, "It cannot be denied that socialist development was oriented more quickly towards socialist democracy in Yugoslavia by the events of 1948 and the following years. This development was the result of the realization that it wasn't possible to follow blindly the dogmatic way that the ideology and practice of Stalinism set out."

Both the break with the Soviet Union and the re-orientation of policy which followed derive from the crucial features of Yugoslav social
and political development outlined above. The “administrative period” is, as it were, an aberration. And yet the modes of thought current in this period continue to influence Yugoslav social organization.

**YUGOSLAV SOCIALISM SINCE 1950: THE THEORY**

Since 1950, organizational forms in Yugoslav society have been in continuous change, so much so that it is sometimes difficult to keep up with the latest modification. Among other changes that have taken place, however, are the following—in no absolute order of precedence:

1. The change from bureaucratic centralized regulation of production and distribution to a controlled market regulation of production and distribution.  
2. The constant, though hesitant, increase, in the name of political self-government of the amount of political choice and control by citizens, especially at lower levels, instanced most recently in the legislation forcing compulsory replacement of all elected officials after a specified term of office.  
3. The re-organization of industry so that legally the supreme management body in any enterprise is the workers’ council, elected by the workers.  
4. Legislation constantly increasing the scope of action and control of workers’ councils and the amount of finance at their disposal.  
5. The devolution, within enterprises, of power from workers’ councils to economic units.  
6. The spread of the self-management idea to every institution of Yugoslav society—schools, hospitals, universities, social insurance offices, housing districts, etc.  
7. The reduction in size of the central organs of bureaucracy, the freeing of the political prisoners, the removal of privilege for party members, the renaming of the party as the League of Communists as an indication that, although it has a leading role, its methods are persuasion, not coercion.

Although the realization of these laws and trends is, in practice, partial, none of them would support a simplistic explanation of Yugoslav society in terms of a malevolent ruling class, exploiting the masses for its own gain; each makes control by such a class more difficult, and in sum they are not compatible with such an explanation. In spite of the fact that it must be accepted that all the more important decisions about the development of the society are still taken centrally by a small group of party leaders, it must also be accepted that there is only one satisfactory interpretation of the trend in the decisions; that it stems from an ideological view of a socialist society as one characterized by the conscious and organized control by the members of society themselves of all the institutions of their society.

In fact, the essence of the theoretical position which is behind this trend has been stated many times by Yugoslav theoreticians, and is given in detail in the well-known 1958 Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists. Deleon summarizes this position, “By merely socializing property [the working class] still remains far from achieve-

ment of its goals, for being emancipated from the capitalist system does not also mean delivery from the new perils of &étatism and bureaucracy. . . . From a historical or theoretical viewpoint one cannot speak of a real qualitative change in social development unless government in the name of the people becomes government by the people themselves . . . the withering away of the state is no more than the socialization of its functions and the gradual clarification of a new concept of the social community which, through the network of social organs that it creates for itself, takes into its own hands the power of decision regarding its destiny, its material values and the satisfaction of its common needs . . . The essence of socialism is its mission of creating new social relationships. The extent to which such relationships are effectively created is the surest criterion of a country’s evolution towards socialism.”

We may present the Yugoslav leaders’ conception of the path to Socialism schematically as in Diagram 1.

Thus, constant reference is made in theoretical writings to the dangers of anarchy on the one hand, and to the need to decrease the amount of state intervention by creating wider areas of group decision taking on the other.

The drive to implement the conception of socialist democracy is modified by other, conflicting, views of the leadership, which can be listed as follows:

1. Probably of least importance in internal policy, although it is very difficult to assess the effect, the international position of Yugoslavia, particularly in terms of the strings attached to the many loans at various times from East and West, and the fear of Yugoslavia’s economic isolation in a Europe divided between trade blocs.

2. There is a desire to maintain, at this top level, power and to some extent, privilege, partly for its own sake, partly because of a feeling that there are divisive elements in the country that might, if not checked by central authority, destroy the whole system.

These latter elements, specific to the Yugoslav situation, have to be taken into consideration. Economic differences between regions were immense, and are still large; determined and continuing efforts to remove them have led to resentment over investment policy and the transfer of funds from rich to poor areas. This economic problem is linked with nationalist rivalries and traditional worries about Serb domination. The policy of allowing freedom of choice to peasants with regard to joining co-operatives has met with traditional peasant suspicion of central government, and memories of the short period of enforced collectivization are still alive (1949-52). Religious strife was connected with terrible atrocities only twenty-five years ago, and is still the cause of much unhappiness on an individual level—parents forbidding marriages, etc. All in all, these problems remain a very serious threat to the stability of any social system in Yugoslavia, and must be taken into consideration.
3. A third factor which holds back the development of the system of socialist democracy in Yugoslavia is a powerful legacy of dogmatic modes of thought which makes itself felt in the work of all the theorists of Yugoslav communism. It is derived from the political socialization of the leadership on the one hand, and reinforced by their social position on the other.

There has been little attempt at reassessment of what might be called the Stalinist demonology among the Yugoslav leadership. More importantly, there is a lack of empirical reference in their work. An analysis of sources in an important theoretical journal indicates that not only is the number of references to other work very small, but the modern work of social scientists, including Yugoslav social scientists, which might be relevant to the functioning of the Yugoslav system is not referred to at all. The analysis reinforces the author's experience in a seminar at Belgrade university in 1961. The participants found it very hard to convey the idea that they were interested in seeing the organizational forms at work.

Since the results of the measures to apply the theory are filtered through a minima of political jargon, it is very difficult, in reading material put out by the Yugoslav government, to find the actual effects of measures, as opposed to what they ought to do, and this even applies when one is talking to local officials. This does not just affect outside observers, however. It has had two major effects on the development of the system in the country. In the first place, unparalleled opportunities for experimentation with different forms of organization have been lost. It would have been uniquely possible, for example, to design partially controlled experiments over a longish period, to find which forms of industrial organization most involved workers in responsible decision taking. In addition, and even more importantly, the policy makers, that is, the leaders of the League of Communists, have not been taking into consideration the actual effects of the framework for self-government they have constructed.

In summary, while the Yugoslav leaders have a theoretical aim which directs their policy in general terms, this aim is tempered by caution at real political problems, which in turn are partly responsible for the general wish to retain power at the higher levels of the circle of leadership. This, and the dogmatic legacy in ways of thinking, characterize the policy of "revolution from the top" in Yugoslavia.

**WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS?**

There can be no doubt that the mass of the Yugoslav population considers the present system of organization preferable to the pre-1950 situation, and there are signs that as levels of education and sophistication grow, the real possibilities presented by the system are beginning to be used. But there can also be no doubt that the Yugoslav system, as it has evolved since 1950, while in general accord with its emphasis on decentralization, with the cultural background of the society outlined above, has not arisen directly from the demands of citizens and workers, but has been worked out, legislated and modified from the top. Workers in Yugoslavia are even now for the most part first generation; many still work part time on the land. To master technical skills is a tremendous problem; to express coherently feelings of dissatisfaction over their working lives in organizational terms has been beyond them. Research indicates that neither in the political nor in the industrial order are people able to comprehend and utilize their existing rights, with the result that those who effectively wield control continue to do so, while a very large number of workers and citizens come to regard the whole system with suspicion, thus not trying to explore fully the opportunities open to them. The remainder of this article explores this theme.

**(d) Political institutions**

As part of the conception of a socialist society, Yugoslav leaders do not see political institutions in terms of a "bourgeois democracy", in which various party machines compete to bribe the temporary allegiance of otherwise passive and apathetic masses. The renaming of the Community Party as the League of Communists symbolizes the desire to replace the very party system by one in which citizens themselves will actively participate in political decision-making at all levels, the practice of direct democracy in a range of institutions giving them the experience and interest that will make the problems meaningful to them. However, in the present situation, the social problems mentioned above would form a basis for the development of political parties. The electoral system therefore remains hedged with restrictions. In its latest form, any group of citizens comprising more than 200 people in a constituency can propose a candidate for nomination as a Federal or Republican Deputy. He must then pass the scrutiny of a electoral commission appointed by the existing parliament. After this, he may be accepted as a candidate if a group comprising more than one tenth of the constituency electorate agree to support him (no canvassing is allowed by any candidate). If this is achieved, one third of the sitting deputies in the local Commune council must agree to his candidacy. Only then can he stand for election. Candidates for deputy at the local Commune level must pass through the first three steps of this process.

This procedure is a slight modification of that outlined in the 1963 Constitution. In the 1965 elections held under this system there were 44,591 candidates for 23,206 seats, so that a contest could have taken place in at most 90.5 per cent of the seats. But the higher the level, the fewer the contests. 300 deputies were elected to the Federal Assembly, but only 346 candidates were confirmed; there were 520 more candidates than seats at the Republican level (for 1,139 seats) but 42,526 candidates for 21,967 seats at the Commune level. This represents some improvement over the 1963 elections, but some candidates, especially at the higher levels, withdrew, reducing the number of contests. Such a system can be used to eliminate "undesirable" candidates. On the other hand, the new electoral laws state that if 20 per cent of the electorate of a constituency is so minded, a deputy can be re-called. More importantly, a candidate cannot submit himself for re-election to the same position after his four-year term of office. Since candidates can stand for other positions, the provision is not as biting as it might seem at first sight.
The effect of the complexity of the electoral system on the average citizen of Yugoslavia, whose educational level is still low—30 per cent of Commune deputies still had less than four years’ schooling in 1963—can only be to discourage him from activity, and to place his reliance on those who have the ability and motivation to try to manipulate the system, i.e., to create just the group of professional politicians it is designed to avoid. Hammond illustrated this in his interesting report of the 1954 election campaign—under a rather simpler system. “At a voters’ meeting in Belgrade attended by the author, a man got up and tried to make a nomination for the nominating committee, but was informed by the Chairman that only groups of 20 could suggest names. After some conversation with people sitting nearby, the man rose again and stated that he now had a group of 20. When asked whom he wished to nominate, he suggested only one nominee, whereupon the Chairman pointed out that he would have to suggest a complete committee. The man... thoroughly confused... gave up and sat down, amid hisses from the audience.”

The multiplication of electoral offices in Yugoslavia has meant that there are a large number of people who serve. Kovacevic has estimated that in 1957 there were about one million such offices, including workers’ council positions, and that therefore every tenth adult Yugoslav was taking part in some form of self-government. But studies of the personnel of these offices, excluding workers’ council members, indicate that there is considerable duplication of office, termed “cumulation of responsibility”. Thus, in a study of 703 political office holders in Rijeka, the average number of “responsibly” positions per office holder was 6.4, with some individuals having as many as 15-20 or more positions. The average activist had been to 11.8 meetings in the last month, again with some having more than one meeting per day! Very many of these people were aware themselves that the quality of the work performed suffered from this duplication. In Smederevo commune, studied in detail by a Franco-Yugoslav research team, 68 per cent of office holders held only one function; they held 43 per cent of the posts. 65 per cent of office holders however had more than four functions; they held 21 per cent of the posts. As one would expect from its real monopoly of political power, and its assigned “leading role” in Yugoslav society, it is not surprising that League members were over-represented in positions of political responsibility. However, this over-representation does not, at the local level, amount to complete monopoly, and it has been found that there is differentiation within the League. Old communists (pre-1945) tended to be concentrated in the more important posts, and League members as a whole tended to be found more frequently in organizations judged by the researchers to be of more political importance. But, although League membership is positively related to higher administrative occupations and political activity, this is less true of recent League members. Nor do the researchers in Smederevo support Djilas’ view of a “new class” in other respects. At this level, League members did not differ from other members of the same occupational groups in terms of either pay, housing standards, possession of consumer goods, or frequency of official visits.

The ambivalence of the attitudes of the political leadership towards the Yugoslav population emerges clearly from this account. There is a desire to create the conditions of a new, direct, socialist democracy; but there is an extreme caution because of the divisive forces existing in Yugoslav society, and a reference to theoretically conceived but not empirically investigated needs leads to a system of extreme complexity, constantly being modified from the top. The consequences of this are that apathy is hardly diminished by the reforms, and that a small group of activists are overburdened with tasks to the detriment of performance efficiency.

(b) Industrial organization

The Yugoslav firm is linked to the socio-political system through the representatives it helps to elect to its chamber of industry of the Local Commune. In the early years of workers’ self-management, relationships with the local Commune appear often to have been dominated by the latter, but recent legislation has reduced somewhat its power to control the individual firm. Beforehand, the appointment of, and any disagreements with, the director of the factory were controlled by the Commune. This is no longer the case. In the two factories in Belgrade studied by Kolaja, it appeared that the workers’ councils adopted an independent attitude towards proposals from the local Commune authorities. More important than its direct relations with political authorities in setting the framework within which the Yugoslav firm operates, are the ways in which it is tied into the planning mechanism.

For the Yugoslav leadership, the lessons that appeared from the administrative period were that fully centralized planning is impossible at a detailed level, since the number of variables to be taken into account is too great, and incompatible with any system of real control by workers, since the latter have no say in what they are going to produce. Nor can consumers effectively exercise any choice beyond what the planners have allowed for.

It thus appears that if self-determination is to be a criterion of socialism, some form of market organization to allow for it is necessary, at least while goods are in short supply. The Yugoslavs have tried to justify this position in terms of Marxist economics. On the other hand, a free market, even with all firms nationalized, will quickly lead to the success of the more fortunate firms at the expense of the less fortunate, the possible exploitation by some firms of a monopoly position, and a persistence of regional disparity. This the Yugoslav leaders characterize as the deviation to anarchy (Diagram 1). Yugoslav planning involves a position of balance between these extremes, with the aid of expanding as far as possible the area of decision taking open to producers and consumers, while ensuring that socially approved priorities are carried out, that non-profitable areas are subsidized where necessary, and that firms are not in a position to exploit a favourable situation at the expense of the rest of the community. The planning which is indicative in type, and now runs on a five-year system, is
based on the estimates by firms of their productive capacity and expansion potential for the next year, together with the proposals of authorities at Commune, Republic, and Federal level as to how they will invest the resources at their disposal. Annual amendments are made. The problem of ensuring that only decisions in line with the general policy of the League of Communists are made, and that resources are available for new investment in backward areas, etc., is solved by the use of two types of influence on the individual firm—economic and social. Economically, the firm is subject to the legally enacted taxation system, which provides funds at each government level. Socially, it is tied into a network of organizations, shown in Diagram 2, which influence the workers' council towards "socially responsible" decisions. A very clear account of the way these organizations operate is given by Waterston. But the system has been bedevilled by planning mistakes, and there has had to be, especially in the sixties, considerable direct intervention to hold down prices. Two sets of economic reforms—of 1962 and 1965—have been introduced in attempts to change the relationships of commodity prices so that this will be less necessary.

Diagram 2 indicates that the individual firm is tied into a national system through complex financial arrangements and by the pressure of other non-financially based social agencies. The scope of action of the firm's workers' management bodies and their relations with the professional managers of the firm is regulated by a complexity of legal enactment, which, like regulations relating to the political system, has constantly been changed. Again, the attempt has been to impose a theoretically correct framework for the development of self-government, without much specific reference to the way the system is working. A large proportion of workers do not have sufficient knowledge of various aspects of the system to be able to operate confidently with it. Thus, in a Smederevo metal working enterprise, 312 workers were asked who takes the decisions in five major areas of factory life—work norms, increases in wages, production plan, bonuses, and distribution of benefits. None answered all five questions correctly, 2 had four correct answers, 67 had three, 69, two, 69, one, and 105 workers did not answer any of the questions correctly. Kolaja found a low level of information about decisions of a workers' council meeting, the day after the meeting. Women workers had not read a bulletin posted about the meeting—one said, "We have children, this is of no interest to us." Ahlk interviewed 146 workers in a Serbian metal-working enterprise with a schedule designed to investigate the amount of knowledge he considered necessary for efficient participation in workers' self-management. He did not test unskilled or illiterate workers. The average score was less than half the possible, with white collar workers doing considerably better than manual workers. Nickovic investigated the amount of knowledge possessed by 230 workers, a sample from nine factories in Macedonia. He comments, "There is a striking fact that a comparatively large number of examinees possess no elementary knowledge and lack information on important social, economic and political problems.

But he also states that workers are better informed on problems of their own enterprise than on wider matters. Radosavljevic, in a survey of ten enterprises in Serbia covering over 1,000 workers, had a 29 per cent "don't know" response in answer to an enquiry as to whether the workers considered the distribution of income in the factory to be correct or not. A study in Varazdin, in Croatia, showed that one-
third of the workers were "reasonably well informed about their enterprise." In a survey of over 2,000 workers in eleven factories in Serbia, only one-third knew the way in which personal incomes were distributed in economic units, and only one-eighth could understand the actual method of distribution. This was confirmed by Meister, 53.5 per cent of whose sample said they never managed to work out what their monthly salary was going to be, the system was too complicated.

Two points should be made in qualification of this picture. First, the ignorance is relative. In interviewing young workers in four factories in Sarajevo, I gained the impression that their knowledge of factory organization was at least as good as that of young workers I had been interviewing in England just before. Secondly, the amount of ignorance varies with the type of worker and the type of factory. It has been shown that women workers, peasant workers, workers in dispersed units know less, and are less involved in their factories than workers with an industrial background. Kolaja's rather negative findings about the efficiency of the self-management system are not unrelated to the fact that in one of the factories he studied, 80 per cent of the workers were women, and that in the other, not only were one-third of the workers women, but the factory was in four separate units, dispersed throughout Belgrade. In Sarajevo, in the four factories I visited, the attitude of deference towards the director was strongest in the factory with most women workers, and least strong in that with a long industrial tradition. The office of the director was in the former, and his bearing, might have been that of a modern managing director in Britain; in the latter factory, the shirt-sleeved director, in a bare office, met workers continually and informally. Nevertheless, in general the system has become too complicated for most of the workers who have to operate it, so that in practice decision-making tends to revert to managerial staff.

Another important way in which the imposition of a "correct" theory impedes the implementation of real workers' self-management in enterprises derives from the conception among the leadership of what it is that leads people to work efficiently. In spite of articles by leading social scientists such as Supik, who are aware of the complexity of this problem, and of the work done with regard to it by such diverse sociologists as Mayo and Friedmann, the official view seems to consist, on the one hand, of vague general assertions about the release of initiative by workers' self-management, and on the other of a specific assertion that the slogan, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work" is the only basis for stimulating efficient performance in Yugoslav conditions. For instance, in the Report of the Federal Executive Council for 1962, it is stated that, as a result of removing certain restrictions, "Considerable differences appeared in the position of working organizations in accordance with their business success, and thereby also considerable differences in the level of the personal incomes of workers employed in them. However, these differences, as long as they remained within definite limits, precisely as a result of a more consistent implementation of the principle of distribution according to labour, stimulated the workers' interest in increasing the efficiency of their enterprise's activity, that is in expanding production and raising the productivity of labour." This attitude has also led to attempts to introduce piecework as widely as possible, attempts to organize office work and other professional occupations on the same bases—in offices this has led apparently to a multiplication of memos, as one of the only objective ways of measuring output—although the performance of the enterprise, the department and the individual affect the individual's income—this is called "payment by complex output" and attempts to increase differentials. All of these are asserted to stimulate people to greater effort, yet it is abundantly clear that people in clerical and professional occupations dislike the system for themselves, and there is considerable opposition from workers as well. With regard to differentials, Kolaja reports that the differential of 7 to 1 between the director's income and their own was considered to be "quite excessive" by some workers. In the survey by Hazdistic et al., 29 per cent of workers thought that differentials should be reduced, and 24 per cent believed that there should be equal pay for all, compared with 22 per cent who thought they should be increased. It would have been interesting to know the attitudes to this question of workers in different occupations within the enterprises studied, but the summary does not give this breakdown. With one-fifth of workers giving no reply, Radasavjevic found 60 per cent thought unskilled workers' wages too low, while 57.5 per cent thought wages paid to management officials too high. With regard to piece rates, the same study showed that a clear majority (60.5 per cent) of workers preferred time-based payment, although this was 13 per cent less than were working on this system.

If to this is added the general dissatisfaction with wage levels which is revealed by all the studies, particularly from lower skill groups—and it is hardly possible to maintain a family without alternative work at the lower income levels—there are substantial grounds for hypothesizing a measure of alienation of workers from the very system that is designed to reduce just that. Hazdistic found the following distribution of replies in answer to the question, "Do you submit your proposals and opinions at meetings of collectives of economic units?": 27 per cent replied that they did so frequently, 44.5 per cent rarely, and 24 per cent not at all. Kozomara, a Bosnian sociologist, with wide experience of research in factories there reports that in spite of the workers' council system, an "us-them" feeling exists between workers and management authorities, paralleling the attitudes which have been so frequently found by sociologists in capitalist countries. When he asked a small group of employees what they thought would strengthen a feeling of ownership of the factory, Kolaja found that unskilled and semi-skilled workers tended to the opinion that increased pay and rewards were the best means; executives thought increased education was of more importance. The latter group, while opposing
"payment by results" schemes when applied to themselves, benefit generally from the widespread application of payment according to work done theories as between groups, and have a vested interest in supporting them.

Thus, a substantial number of workers do not understand how the system works, except in the broadest outline. They feel they have no control over monetary payments which they disapprove of, and anyway, their main aim must be to try to scrape together as much money as possible to keep their families going. They therefore become alienated from the system as a whole, and, as Kolaja points out, such groups have no one to represent their interests, as the trade unions often do not function very effectively at the local level.

A third set of problems of workers' self-management arises from relations between workers, their representatives on the workers' councils, and the managerial staff. In spite of legislation aimed at ensuring proportional representation of manual and non-manual workers, it should be noted that workers' councils seriously underrepresent women workers, young workers, and, most importantly, semi and unskilled workers. In 1964, women were about 8 per cent underepresented, and skilled and highly skilled workers about 22.5 per cent overrepresented on workers' councils. Second, although there is considerable turnover in workers' councils, there is also considerable continuity. Of those elected in 1962, 28 per cent were in their second term of office, 11 per cent in their third, and a further 9.3 per cent had served more than three times previously, a finding confirmed by the empirical research on individual factories. The workers' council is thus to some extent socially differentiated from the general body of workers of a factory, both in its occupational structure, and in the extent of its experience of management. Radosavljević's study, which compared the attitude of workers' council members with those of ordinary workers over a series of questions, found differences between the two groups on all of them, the workers' council being more oriented towards management/official views. Some observers have explained this exclusively in terms of the overrepresentation of League of Communist members on workers' management bodies, but in the author's view, this is less important as an explanation than the relationships entered into between the workers' council and the director and his full time managerial staff. At the workers' council meetings, members of the latter group present reports giving information and their recommendation as to what decision should be taken. Workers' council members do not have this information beforehand; nor do they have the skills to assimilate it quickly; nor do they have the skills to present criticisms in the form of coherent alternatives.

An analysis of workers' council minutes of the two factories studied by Kolaja indicated a high degree of participation by management in the discussions, and that a large majority of accepted suggestions came from them. His observations of actual meetings indicate that where disagreement between the director and workers' council members occurred, the director was easily able to out-argue the latter. Furthermore, discussion of items such as the apportionment of money for flats aroused much more concern than did major problems of finance and policy, which workers clearly did not comprehend. Observations at the workers' council meeting attended by the author at a factory near Sarajevo support this view. This was a factory producing hardboard and plywood products, with about 1,100 workers, mainly of low skill categories, and a workers' council of 36. It had been set up in 1954, and many of the workers were still part peasant, spending their leisure time cultivating a small plot. At the meeting, three items were discussed:

1. The position of the maintenance department in relation to the distribution of bonuses between departments in the factory.
2. The position of wages in the factory in the light of rises in the cost of living—it was proposed by the director to raise all wages and prices.
3. The allocation of flats to factory workers from funds provided by the factory.

Of these, the second item is clearly the most important from the point of view of the long-term future of the factory. The director made proposals which entailed slight rises in the price of products which, together with greater efficiency in production, would enable 2,400 dinars a month to be added to the wages of the lowest paid, and 1,600 to those of the highest. Thus problems of wages, prices and differentials were involved. The director spoke for about fifteen minutes on the topic, outlining various possible alternatives and his reasons for favouring this one. His proposals were accepted almost without discussion. But on the first and third items there was lively discussion. On the first, some members considered the maintenance department was not entitled to a bonus, since the machines had to stop when being serviced, thus losing productivity. Others countered this view. On the question of flats, some of the contributions were of the form, "I have several children and relatives to look after—I deserve a flat before anyone else." Others attempted to use some principle of need in general for allocation and sort out priority cases according to them. There was a long discussion as to what to tell those who had been refused flats at this allocation. As in Kolaja's case, in this discussion, as opposed to that on price and wage increases, some council members took notes.

Although the problems of wages, prices and differentials were of vital interest to them, workers' council members in this factory found the topic too abstract to be able to grasp. The International Labour Office report on workers' management mentions that in some factories, management's documents and diagrams are cyclostyled to enable workers' council members to comprehend the more difficult problems. In the factory studied by the author, consciousness had not risen to the level of demanding this type of aid.

The factories studied by Kolaja and myself were poor examples of the functioning of workers' management because of the composition of their labour forces. However, they illustrate the problems involved. Because of the superior debating power and information possessed by
those at managerial level, workers' councils tend to look to them as a reference group, and to become partially assimilated to their view of factory problems. They find themselves taking decisions which they do not fully understand, based on principles which they, and particularly the other workers in the factory, may not fully accept. This sets them off in their role as worker managers from other workers, a process that is reinforced by the different occupational structure of the workers' council from the rest of the factory and the tendency to re-election. This in turn reinforces feelings of alienation that have been discussed above. In the survey in Smederevo, half the workers interviewed thought that members of political and social organizations (undefined, but presumably including workers' management bodies) used their positions to get better jobs in the factory and to improve their social/economic situation. There was no evidence as to whether this was actually the case or not, but the perception was real.

There are therefore three sources of retardation in the development of real workers' self-management within the Yugoslav factory:

1. The extreme complexity of the system of factory organization and income distribution for workers with a low educational level.
2. The existence of large-scale dissatisfaction with methods of distribution of income, with income levels, and with differentials.
3. The tendency for members of the workers' council to become assimilated to management perceptions of the problems of the factory in their role as worker-managers.

Clearly, some of the measures, particularly those which have increased the complexity of the system, and above all those which seek to enshrine the principle of remuneration according to work as an absolute, have tended to create an alienation they were designed to combat, with consequent effects on production. As in the political order, however, change is still occurring. There is a tendency for further devolution of authority within enterprises, to the various departments, or "economic units" of which they are composed. In a content analysis of minutes of workers' council meetings over the whole period of workers' self-management, Tanic has indicated that, when viewed as part of a process, there have been changes away from the personalized approach to problems; the nature of the problems dealt with has itself changed so that the major problems of the enterprises receive a greater amount of discussion. In these terms, it can be argued that advanced workers are slowly "catching up with the system", and the increasing number of strikes which has occurred in the last few years might be considered to indicate that workers' collectives are asserting their real control over dominant directors and workers' councils subservient to them. They have notably been in the more advanced areas of the country.

It is inconceivable that the system should be replaced; weaknesses or not, alienation or not, in general it has become accepted among Yugoslav workers. One young worker in a Sarajevo factory asked me quite seriously at the end of an interview, "Is it true that in England

the workers don't manage the factories?"

CONCLUSION

Some commentators, such as Sturmthal and Kolaja seem to measure the Yugoslav system (its industrial aspects) against a totally unsociological absolute in which every individual would act perfectly responsibly, in harmony with his own and others' interests. On the discovery that the League of Communists, the managerial group and the director play a large part in the running of the factory, they return with thankfulness to their own system of industrial relations in which, "The management manages and the trade unions perform their functions." Other commentators, on the political system, remain complacent in their prejudices, which are, as McVicker says, "Those of the average scholar who knows no doubts as to the superiority of constitutional democracy as a political system."

Such approaches are unacceptable. The development of Yugoslav society and of its governing party cannot be ignored in any assessment of social self-government in Yugoslavia. Decentralization of effective authority has been a feature of Yugoslav development. The Yugoslav Communist Party reflected this in its own early history, and later through the exigencies of wartime activity. The centralized system of authority of 1945-50 was therefore in contradiction with the experience of both the majority of the population, and of party leaders. But the social self-government system whose introduction was occasioned by the break with the Soviet Union in 1948 has been distorted both by the concern of the leadership group with potentially violent sources of social conflict in economic, national and religious divisions, and by their own ideological training in the pre-war period. The result has been the constant, largely arbitrary, multiplication of controls and "improvements", leading to a system of great complexity, and this in turn has led to incomprehension and suspicion among large sections of the population. It has been shown that self-government in the industrial and political orders suffers when its actual functioning is compared to the claims made for it by some Yugoslav writers: "Thanks to social self-government in Yugoslavia, a final and true victory has been won by a political system of direct democracy and socialism in which the chief burden of further development is carried by the masses of working people who by their creativeness and everyday experience increasingly influence the further process of socialism, whose aims are, the full progress of working man and of mankind in general."

Nevertheless, a large scale attempt to decentralize the control of social institutions is an unique response on a national basis to problems of organization and development in a modern industrial society, although one based on conceptions that have interested the labour movements of many other countries. The system is still changing, as the current discussion of a complete division between Party and State indicates. For these reasons, the consideration of social self-government in Yugoslavia today has much more than purely local significance. The country provides a laboratory for research on the possibilities of decentralization of control in modern large scale society and its psychological effects.
There are virtually no limitations—except those of language—to such research at the present period.

NOTES


10Ibid., p. 104.


12A Serbian proverb runs, “If you want a Serb to do something—tell him its opposite.”

13See the historical surveys in Aute, and Heppell and Singleton, op. cit.


17Ibid., op. cit., p. 53.


22There were disagreements between the Yugoslav and Soviet parties in the first four Congresses of the Comintern—Avakumovic, op. cit., p. 35.

23Avakumovic comments, “Stalin and his Yugoslav accomplices operating on Soviet soil succeeded in killing more members of the Central Committee than either the Yugoslav police in the entire inter-war period, or the Axis in the Second World War. (p. 129).”

24The first conference of the Communist Party of Croatia sent the following telegram to Stalin, “The dear words, ‘Comrade Stalin’ are our programme” (p. 145).

25E. Bauer, “Yugoslawische Marxismus und Anarchosyndikalismus”, Donauram, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1964), p. 207. Avakumovic considers the influence of workers’ committees set up by the Bela Kun regime in Hungary to have been more important.

26A good account is in V. Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1953).

27Ibid., op. cit., p. 308-9.


29See note 9. Avakumovic mentions that the communist party occasionally set up workers’ and peasants’ committees during the inter-war period.


31In the factory studied by Meister, absenteeism had been running at 20% and labour turnover at about 140% in 1949-50. A. Meister, Socialisme et Autogestion (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1964), p. 88.


34There are various estimates of the effects of the new decentralised system on the bureaucracy, but they were clearly drastic. The Federal Civil Service decreased in size from 43,500 in 1948 to 8,000 in 1955. Another source estimates that 58,000 people left their places of work in 1949 and 1950, and a third estimate that number of trade union officials (full time) was reduced from 4,000 to about 400: Waterston, op. cit., p. 28; J. Fisera, “Enquetes sur le Cmisme des Responsabilités en Yougoslavie”, Archives Internationales de la Sociologie de la Co-operation, Vol. 10 (1961), p. 150; L. Philippart, “La Gestion et l’Organisation des Universités Ouvrières en Yougoslavie”, in Le Regime et les Institutions de la Republique Populaire Federative de Yougoslavie (Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1959), p. 34.

35Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 175.

36Ibid., p. 345.

37Dedijer, op. cit. All general studies of post-war Yugoslavia have accounts of this period.


39Neal reports that this was a period of psychosomatic illness for many of the leaders: F. W. Neal, Titism in Action (Univ. of California Press, 1958), p. 4.

40Dedijer, op. cit., pp. 144-5.


42Outlined in Waterston, op. cit.

43Articles 81, 82, 83 of the Constitution. The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Secretariat for Information of the Federal Executive Council, 1963). The system has been further amended in a more democratic direction. See “Several Candidates for Each Seat”.


For example, directors of all factories are now appointed by the workers' council of the enterprise, and are subject to re-election every four years: "New Trends in the System of Self-government", Yugoslav Life, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1964), p. 1.

4Discussion of economic or working units within enterprises can be found in M. Drenjanin, "Working Units Within Organizations and Income Distribution", Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 17 (1945), pp. 49-70; and in "Workers' Self-management in Economic (working) Units", Yugoslav Survey, Vol. 4, No. 12 (1965), pp. 1690-3.


6See footnote 3 above.

7Numbers of political prisoners dropped from 52,506 in 1949, to around 200 in 1964—Auty, op. cit. (1965), p. 120.

8Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 175.

9Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists (Belgrade, 1958), p. 239 ff.


11"A very good discussion of this problem is by H. Brika, "La Place des Conseils Ouvriers dans l'Ordre Socialiste", Questions Actuelles du Socialisme, No. 43 (1957), pp. 69-104.

12Hoffman and Neal give details of aid received, and a brief discussion of its effects, op. cit., p. 384.

13Tito's penchant for luxurious living is already mentioned by Korbel, and some Yugoslav communists are very critical of it. This is not to say that the leadership is corrupt. J. Korbel, Tito's Communism (University of Denver Press, 1965).

14Kardelj is often cited as one of the most radical of the Yugoslav leaders. But see his attack on Trotsky in Socialism and War (p. 28). In spite of disclaimers, the rest of this book is largely an exercise in the utilization of texts from Marx and Lenin. E. Kardelj, Socialism and War (London: Methuen, 1961).

15Socialist Thought and Practice contains translations of the most important articles by leading members of the League of Communists, many of them from Pravda and Pravda Sozialistam. 43 articles in this journal from the period 1962-5 were analyzed. Only 21 sources were given in text or footnotes. More than half of the references were to socialist classics, and nearly another fifth were to the work of Yugoslav leaders. There were seventeen references to the work of economists and two to that of philosophers, making 13% of the total.

16Meister, op. cit., p. 7.

17"Self-government" is the creation of lawyers more than of workers, a continuous creation marked by the uneven evolution of new rules; and the full and conscious participation in self-government demands knowledge of its legal framework and laws which regulate it"—Meister, op. cit., p. 90.


21Ibid., p. 2149.


23Ibid., p. 2149.


28There are now four different chambers as well as the directly elected one, representing different areas of social self-government.


31"The market is not left to the blind action of elementary forces, but consciously controlled by the social plan, which co-ordinates the immediate interests of the enterprise with the interests of the social community"—Anon., "Evolution du Systeme . . ." op. cit., p. 120.


33The way the firm is tied into the financial system is clearly shown in the diagram in Singleton and Topham, "Workers' Control . . ." op. cit., p. 12.

34Watson, op. cit., pp. 92-5.


44The author did one month's research in four factories in Sarajevo in central Yugoslavia in Summer 1964 on a Unesco research grant.


A different sort of pragmatism

JOLFE ROSSE

MARXISM IS THE PHILOSOPHY of the self-liberation of the proletariat, and therefore, naive though it may sound, I expect when I open a book which proudly boasts on its jacket that someone in the Guardian called it "the most interesting and relevant piece of Marxist theoretical writing that has appeared for some time", that it will say something about the self-liberation of the proletariat.

Moreover, knowing that in the present instance the author is an admirer of peasant guerrilla bands, and knowing what Marx said of the latter in his own day, as being reactionary vestiges of the radicalism of a long bygone age, I had assumed that I would find something to explain the dialectic of the thesis of guerrilla-warfare and the antithesis of Marxism, and their synthesis. Alas, it was not to be. I defy any reader of Regis Debray's Revolution in the Revolution (Penguin, 35. 6d.) to find any one passage in that book that can suggest for a moment that the author has studied the Marxist method of social analysis or the economic determinism of revolution. Nay, I would go further, since the author does on two occasions quote Lenin, and is obviously under the impression that Marxism did not begin with "St. Charley Marx and all Engels", but with Lenin, I defy any reader to find any real evidence of any thorough study of Lenin within the book.

Marx attacked Michael Bakunin and other revolutionaries of his day for failing to appreciate the point of his claims for the proletariat as against the peasantry. He did not say the workers were intrinsically better people or the peasants worse, he said that to have a small holding of land and to learn to protect this as against neighbouring landowners, even more to rent it and protect one's self against one's landlord, is to learn to become an individualist. Every other peasant is your rival. To be a worker, on the other hand, to have your wages fixed by what other workers will work for, to be laid off with thousands of others when the market is slack, is to learn the importance of solidarity. These are natural responses to the intrinsic states of certain conditions of life. Rightly or wrongly, Marx believed that individualism could never again play a radical role. What does Debray say? "Any man, even a comrade, who spends his life in a city is unwittingly bourgeois in comparison with a guerrillero. He cannot know the material effort involved in eating, sleeping, moving from one place to another—brieelly, in surviving. Not to have any means of subsistence except what you yourself can produce with your own hands, starting from nature in the raw. The city-dweller
lives as a consumer. As long as he has some cash in his pocket, it suffices for his daily needs. Of course it is not really enough, but with the affluence of the Yankees and the corruption that follows in their wake, more can be earned without too much difficulty.”

In other words, to go to revolution the best way would be to go back to the purity of natural hunting and non-sociate man. Stalinist policies are certainly likely to take any survivors back there, but there is no evidence in history that this is the road to socialism. According to Debray, “During two years of warfare, Fidel did not hold a single political rally in his zone of operations.” He declares that “armed propaganda follows military struggle but does not precede it”, and earlier, armed propaganda is defined: “The physical force of the police and army is considered unassailable, and unassailability cannot be challenged by words but by showing that a soldier and a policeman are no more bullet-proof than anyone else.”

Throughout the book there is no discussion of what sort of society it is hoped to build, no discussion of workers’ control or of human freedom, and indeed, except for an attack on “Trotskyists” for their sectarianism in constantly insisting that the revolution must be socialist and working-class, no hint that socialism is anything more than a name applied to a government where, by force, Castroites have come to power. (One fears he flatters the Trots.) Obviously there was also no effort to discuss these factors with the peasants—who might well have been alienated if they’d been told that the revolutionaries were against private property. Says Debray, “They believe that revolutionary awareness and organisation must and can in every case precede revolutionary action” and he speaks of “…ideologies which Lenin repeatedly described a indigenous to the working class, and which he said would again and again come to the fore whenever Marxists and Communists lowered their guard: economics and spontaneity.”

Debray does not believe the working class is capable of spontaneous socialist action, and believes in a Vanguard (as we shall see in detail) but does not believe that it is necessary for this Vanguard to inculcate revolutionary awareness before involving people in revolutionary action. In other words they are to be tricked into such action. “A certain party leadership removes a substantial number of cadres and combatants from the guerrilla force and sends them abroad to a school for political cadres. … Another leadership restrains or ‘controls’ the political development of its military cadres, by flattering them with ‘political commissars’, straight from the city.” Even the elitist instruction rather than persuasion normally found among Communist agencies once gathering from the disapproving tones of this quotation is judged to be a waste of time.

“If they must hold a meeting, they pretend to assemble the population by force, so that if threatened with repression, the people can claim they were coerced.” No doubt American troops in Vietnam can make the same claim, it used to be the justification British troops used in Kenya during the Mau Mau period for many shows of force.

“It is less risky and safer for a guerrilla group to make raids on neighbouring villages from its own base, by vehicle if necessary (seizing and later abandoning a truck), in order to attain food-stuffs and field equipment (knapsacks, blankets, boots, clothing, etc.), to create its own supply depots. . . .” The saying: Lord protect me from my friends, mine enemies I can take care of myself, is given new meaning!

Debray says, “Whereas in Vietnam the military pyramid of the liberation forces is built from the base up, in Latin America it tends to be built from the apex down . . .” and “The circumstances of this same war of liberation led certain parties originally composed of students and of the best of the workers’ elite to withdraw to the countryside to carry on the guerrilla war against the occupying forces.” He quotes a remark of Guevara, addressing party comrades: “You are capable of creating cadres who can endure torture and imprisonment in silence but not of training cadres who can capture a machine gun nest”, and he comments “this remark in no way constitutes an appraisal of courage; it is a political evaluation”.

The best militants in the towns are removed from that sphere of action at which they formerly shone, the leadership is artificially created from above and the extent of political consciousness is judged by militaristic ability. One need not draw attention to the elitism inherent in it all.

This should be enough to give something of the outlines of Debray’s thoughts, to show that he is concerned for the quest for the Superman not the self-liberation of the masses. He might no doubt be at home with Stirnerism, but in justice to Marx (however little justice Marx may have given his anarchist opponents) it is essential to insist that here is no Marxist. The author of these remarks cannot be an economic determinist. For good measure he declares, “Life, for the revolutionary, is not the supreme good.”

However, more is revealed than just elitism, terrorism, disregard of mass wishes, crooked opportunism which talks of revolution but is totally pragmatic when it comes to considering how the revolution shall be forwarded and which ignores the purpose of the revolution. For we find sheer duplicity, reckoned naively, as if the Stalinists boasted of how they betrayed socialist resistance to Franco in Spain.

“Afier the landing, Fidel assigned Faustino Perez to reorganize the movement in Havana, and gave him full authority to place it under the leadership of a force which, as we know, consisted of 20 men. (Jan. 1957.) All available arms were sent to the Sierra Maestra; not one gun was to be diverted to the urban resistance.” For years Castro fought in the Sierra with little real effect on the regime, then the Batista regime was crippled by a General Strike in Havana. Castro did not then seize the chance to enter the capital, but copied the Russian policy at Warsaw during the Ghetto uprising, when the Jewish and Polish national resistance forces rose gallantly and were liquidated by the Nazis within a day’s march of the Russian tanks which were halted for a week while the resistance was wiped out. (Thus eliminating possible rivals for
power.)

Just as the Russians marched into Warsaw when it was defended only by German troops worn out by their struggle with the maquis, so Castro entered Havana when the Batista regime was weary after its struggle against the workers. Now, to add insult to injury, no credit is given the strikers for their work and they are dismissed: "The ruling class possessed all the means for repressing and crushing a general strike, but all these same resources were of no avail against guerrilla warfare... It was logical that the Sierra should assume the responsibility of leadership."

The only possible interest of the book is for those who wish to chart the degeneration of a theory, from being a philosophy of freedom and equality to being one of enslavement and class rule; a process by no means unique in the history of political theories. If one starts with Marx—who for all his faults—insisted on the self-liberation of the proletariat, who insisted that the party for itself was insignificant, who warned continuously that the petit-bourgeoisie and the peasantry were irremediably reactionary and that middle-class saviours would attempt to take over the workers' movement and lead it away from socialism. The change to Leninism (rather than Lenin) is enormous (Lenin having argued from the special conditions of Russia). An elite party of primarily petit-bourgeoisie, a revolution resting jointly on the proletariat and peasantry and justifying a harsh proletarian rule in order to prevent a peasant-backed reactionary movement emerging. Total emphasis on the vanguard party's role in leading the proletariat to revolution, insistence that socialism is the proletarian party's control of the state—but also insistence that the vanguard party acts at the heart of urban proletarian struggles.

Then comes Debret: A purely subjective use of class terms—so that instead of defining people on the basis of their relationship to production, he does so on the basis of their attitude to "armed struggle". No interest shown in the nature of the society that is to be built, the attitude to power corresponding to that of our Labour "Leftists" of yesteryear, who were always telling disarmers that they must vote Gaitskell into power—even though they admitted that he did not stand for unilateral disarmament or any vestige of a socialist policy—power was all-important for its own sake: not workers' power, not power to make socialist reforms, but power, naked power for the Labour leadership. The emphasis on the guerilla movement as the vanguard is therefore merely a "revolutionary" variant of political pragmatism. Believing that the dweller in the wilds is more socialist than the townsman. But the final absurdity is only reached when the urban admirers of Debret, particularly in industrialised countries, calling themselves Marxist, using the terms bourgeois and proletarian in the same subjective sense, reinterpret Debret so as to make townsmen once again revolutionary, but this time not those who are objectively workers, for these are bourgeoisified, but a small minority of petit-bourgeois who in some mystic way have been translated to become proletarians. Thus Marxism means its opposite.