The limits of pacifism

KINGSLEY WIDMER

TO APPRECIATE THE VIRTUE AND POSSIBILITIES OF LIBERTARIAN PACIFISM WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER SOME OF ITS LIMITATIONS. APPROPRIATELY ENOUGH THESE DAYS, PACIFISTS ARE BUSY DEFYING-AND-LOVING THEIR ENEMIES, AND SEEMINGLY HAVE LITTLE TIME FOR PUBLIC SELF-CRITICISM. INDEED, SOME SHORTCOMINGS OF INTELLECTUAL RICHNESS, WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE RESULT IN MORE CONTROVERSY, WIT, SATIRE, ART, IMAGINATIVE PLAY AND DIALECTICS, PROVIDES ONE OF MY CRITICISMS. THIS IS AN INORDINATELY BORING, AND BORED, SOCIETY; ITS DEFICIENCIES NEED MORE RANGE AND VERVE. THE OBVIOUS HISTORICAL REASONS FOR THE ANTI-INTELLECTUAL AND ANTI-ESTHETIC CAST SOMETIMES CHARACTERIZING PACIFISM—MORAL PURITANISM, EVANGELISTIC PSYCHOLOGY, FUNDAMENTALISTIC UTOPIANISM, ETC.—MAY NO LONGER APPLY. CHANGES ARE NOW EVIDENT; FURTHER PROVOCATION MAY BE IN ORDER.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE IDEOLOGY OF NONVIOLENCE, WITH ITS DYNAMICS OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND MORAL DRAMATIZATION, SOMETIMES OBSCURES OTHER POSSIBILITIES, AND PERHAPS SOME OF THE ESSENTIAL NATURE, OF THE PACIFIST IMPULSE. BUT IT IS OFTEN DIFFICULT TO ARGUE HOW LIMITED AND LIMITING NONVIOLENCE MAY BE WITH ITS PIELISTS. IF, FOR INSTANCE, ONE POINTS OUT PRESENT INADEQUACIES OF SMALL-GROUP NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE AGAINST EXTREME FORMS OF AUTHORITARIANISM, THE PIELISTS RESPOND THAT WHEN NONVIOLENCE BECOMES A SUFICIENTLY LARGE MOVEMENT DEDICATED FULLY TO LOVE AND SACRIFICE, IT WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE AGAINST ANY EXTREME OF AUTHORITY. POSSIBLY, BUT IF THAT IMPOSSIBILITY DOES HAPPEN, MANY OF US SHOULD BE PROTESTING (NONVIOLENTLY, OF COURSE) AGAINST IT. FOR PACIFISM, SURELY, HAS NO ARCANE CHARM TO WARD OFF THE HISTORICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MASS MOVEMENTS: THE SIMPLIFIED IDEOLOGY, THE MORAL PURITANISM, THE CHILIACTIC RIGHTEOUSNESS, THE CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP—AND THE INEVITABLE DOWNGRADING OF SPONTANEITY, VARIETY, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. TO POINT TO PRESENT INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL GROUPS (OR OCCASIONAL LOOSE LARGE ASSOCIATIONS) AND SIMPLY MULTIPLY THEIR CHARACTERISTICS INTO THE FUTURE IS DISHONEST. AFTER ALL, WE MUST SUPPOSE THE SELF-CONSCIOUS LIBERTARIAN PACIFIST TO HAVE PARTLY ACHIEVED HIS CONVICTIONS BY BEING OPPOSED TO MASS-MOVEMENTS, INCLUDING MASS-MOVEMENTS TO END ALL MASS-MOVEMENTS.

IN APPROPRIATE SITUATIONS THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENCE MAY BE NOT ONLY HEROIC PROTEST AND POWERFUL MORAL FORCE BUT EVEN LIBERTARIAN...
Once upon a time discrimination between kinds of violence might have been extended to distinctions between a “just” and “unjust” war. In modern times, radical social moralists substituted “revolution” for “just war.” But when, more recently, they found out that in the very process revolutionary movements had to become, in fact, violent modern authoritarian states (even before they became recognized governments), any justness to a full scale violent revolutionary movement became questionable. Yet that does not fully settle the question of social and political violence. Whether or not there is still any place for a “just war”—a home-defending militia, group guerrilla activity against an authoritarian oppressor, an organized act of violence by a mistreated minority who seek not power but simply to dramatize, educate, and heroically protest by their violence (just as others do by nonviolence)—surely is not, except to the doctrine, a closed question. Perhaps propagating some forms of suicide (as nonviolent civil disobedience can become under certain circumstances) may be to encourage individual or group murder; perhaps proposing some ultimate gesture of violent defence (as in the “just war”, under limits which must preclude power and vengeance) may be to encourage a final commitment to individual and communal value. By the same logic with which ahimsa may create sacred force, so, done in a similar spirit, may certain forms of violence. Neither proper discrimination about the kinds of force we confront, nor Gandhian and similar doctrines, suggest nonviolent ideology as an adequate view of the possibilities of protest or of meaningful choice.

Covert resistance. Among the choices against a destructive order, many pacifists (like myself, people with violent feelings), often show “wisely recognizes that the violence of individual nature (only partly confronted, partly sublimated in the ideology of nonviolence) and dehumanized violence (the Bomb, military bureaucracy, authoritarian powers) are not only different in degree but in kind. I suggest that not the moral problem of individual violence but all that we have come to see as intimately part of nihilistic modern power is the social issue of libertarian pacifism. It might be reasonable, moral, and human and strikingly expressive of the traditional American character—to be, in some circumstances, a violent person and a principled pacifist. While I am not arguing for violence as such, there are considerable doubts about the total adequacy of nonviolence. Even the moral issue, for it is more than a jeu d’esprit to hold that it is better for men with murderous desires to commit murder than for them to persuasively organize all social action and thought into an impersonally murderous system. One must suppose some moral and therapeutic possibilities for the would-be murderer confronting his potential actions; there would, in contrast, seem to be little but righteous obtuseness for the political, scientific, commercial and other bureaucrats “peacefully” dedicating themselves to “defence”, “research”, “national security”, and other forms of impersonal, unheroic, and hypocritical destruction. Part of the real pathos of super-war is not that men just die, but that “dying well” has been superseded by massively shapeless, indiscriminate, meaningless death.

and practical. No argument there, unless, as I fear in several cases has been true, present nonviolence is distorted by being significantly subordinated not to the present situation but to “preparing for a future mass nonviolent movement”. Even if this be just pretentious self-congratulation, nonviolent pacifism can have its own sly forms of moral corruption in which the present actuality is distorted for a supposedly ideal future.

But what, it is said, positive alternative do you propose? (Even American radicals can be all too American in the national vice of “positive thinking”—as if negating the negative weren’t the most positive thing one could do these days!) So, besides sceptically viewing nonviolence as but one means for minority social protest, moral education, and individual gesture, let me pose the possibility of several moral and intellectual enlargements of the libertarian pacifist limits.

Violent pacifism. Sheer contradiction? Certainly to evangelical and Gandhian pacifists—there are some others, you know—violence is the simple crux. But the matter may bear more thinking. That not inconsiderable number who have found, through personal experience, that armies and wars are no damn good, but who have not the moral perfectionism of rejecting self-defence and perhaps some other forms of violence, hold a reasonable and pragmatic view. For they make a most essential modern differentiation: there is the violence of individual men which has its own justifications, and moral perplexities; and there is the violence of the modern state and mass society with its totally unindividual means and results of destruction which have no justifications and are beyond any possible individual meaning. Such a distinction wisely recognizes that the violence of individual nature (only partly confronted, partly sublimated in the ideology of nonviolence) and dehumanized violence (the Bomb, military bureaucracy, authoritarian powers) are not only different in degree but in kind. I suggest that not the moral problem of individual violence but all that we have come to see as intimately part of nihilistic modern power is the social issue of libertarian pacifism. It might be reasonable, moral, and human and strikingly expressive of the traditional American character—to be, in some circumstances, a violent person and a principled pacifist. While I am not arguing for violence as such, there are considerable doubts about the total adequacy of nonviolence. Even on the moral issue, for it is more than a jeu d’esprit to hold that it is better for men with murderous desires to commit murder than for them to persuasively organize all social action and thought into an impersonally murderous system. One must suppose some moral and therapeutic possibilities for the would-be murderer confronting his potential actions; there would, in contrast, seem to be little but righteous obtuseness for the political, scientific, commercial and other bureaucrats “peacefully” dedicating themselves to “defence”, “research”, “national security”, and other forms of impersonal, unheroic, and hypocritical destruction. Part of the real pathos of super-war is not that men just die, but that “dying well” has been superseded by massively shapeless, indiscriminate, meaningless death.
and undercutting the repressive ritualism? As a factory or office worker, have you done your quietly disruptive bit to humanize abstract "work schedules" and anarchize "chains of command"? As a "citizen", "consumer", "audience", etc., the commitments of the libertarian. I assume, not only lead to violations of these speciously normative roles but make him one who encourages mockery, inversion, and burlesque at such times as more hard-nosed and dramatic forms of dissent do not seem feasible. For some libertarian pacifists, after all, move in relative worlds, in institutions which they do, or should, democratize by waywardness.

Put another way, American moral puritanism about work and social behaviour, given the destructive production and genteel authoritarianism of our society, is immoral. The moral absolutist answer is to abstain and withdraw, but there are—though rarely discussed—ways of dissent and defiance from within. I am told that to both do something and to defy doing it at the same time is contradictory to the point of being comic. Precisely: Moral purity and absolutist consistency are limited values. Defiance may take, and for many must take, the lively human ways of comedy as well as the more austere, and sometimes dangerously righteous, ways of tragic gesture. This is sometimes put as "where to draw the line", only it must really be a whole series of lines, from the flamboyant slash to the sly scratch. Here, in styles of protest, we have much we need to learn, propound, create, though no study groups, position papers, or even pacifist exhortations seem to be allowed such "unearned" subjects. The relevant equations of principle, practicality, and personality cannot, of course, be simply logical formulas. But there is a logic, or at least an art, of getting up to the line without necessarily getting fired, jailed, or assaulted more than occasionally. It is an honour, and even a necessity, I would say, to be punished sometimes for your convictions (otherwise you don't really know where the line is), but too much honour is synonymous with stupidity. Most deeply, I take it, the libertarian pacifist position has a purpose, and one not adequately met by the ideology of nonviolence (and its political extensions): to create an effective style of protest of whole ways of doing, thinking, and feeling.

Radical defiance. Revolutions, especially to pacifists, may be located mostly in the hearts of men, but their actions best take place neither in the heart nor in the abstract public-political realm, but in the concrete daily world. For even mass violence is not the thing-in-itself—we protest though the deadness of intelligence and sensitivity which refuses to perceive it, feel it, and respond to it may well be. From this perspective, the moral casuistry of many pacifists is painfully limited. To take but a few of many examples: Those who accept the technological and pathological yearnings to escape the distinctly human, the "new frontiers" of outer space, if only space-technology were not subordinate to war-ideology, miss the real issue, and evil, of "space". Similarly with those who object to the so-called "economy of abundance" only because it has been most extravagantly abundant in producing such artifacts as forty thousand atomic bombs—as if the bombs were not just the most obvious manifestation of meaningless production taken as an end in itself. Or those who favour an "expanding economy", so long as it doesn't grow militarily, though a greater rate of economic growth almost certainly means greater military growth. Or note the strange arguments of those who are aware of the injustices of economic distribution, but assume that "more for all" answers the charge of "unfair to some". (Even if everybody had "enough"—which seems feasible. For some libertarian pacifists, after all, move in relative worlds, in institutions which they do, or should, democratize by waywardness.) Or the bland assumption that if we only behaved with good moral surfaces, such as spending a significant part of our fifty military billions on world charity, everything would be just fine—as if that could not be twisted to just another manner of war. (We could also, in the good American spirit of compromise and the double-play, combine radioactive poison and mountains of charitable food—to satisfy both the political liberals and rightists—and make everybody happy, and dead.) But enough. One feels almost quaint in radically suggesting that the obvious "anti-war principle" is not enough. Peaceful uses of super-technology, non-warfare uses of economic abundance, or idealized futures for peace mechanisms (such as the UN, when its enthusiasts ignore its authoritarian and destructive possibilities if it ever became a genuinely powerful and armed organization), are touchingly "liberal" principles. "Liberal pacifism" is surely, like almost any sort of pacifism these days, decent and desirable, though a radical can hardly believe that it recognizes the difficulties in the way of a genuinely peaceful, and truly free and fraternal, good society.

Liberal pacifism can, perhaps, become what it in essence is: the only large scale pacifist political possibility. The nonviolent pacifist movement I do not think can, nor should it have the power arrogance to try to, be on "the side of history". It is best, and crucially important, as one form of individual, small group, and, perhaps, oppressed minority protest. As an advance guard, its truths may be ameliorated into a liberal pacifist movement. There also are, or should be. I have noted, other styles of libertarian pacifist protest, radical defiance. The three positions are not exclusive, and need not be practically antagonistic. True protest, I am arguing, does not directly seek to create a mass movement, a politicalism, or even new instrumentalities of social order or of peace. The "others" inevitably control, or think they control, society, institutions, and history. We simply defy that power and its pretences. Freedom-and-peace, of course, can never fully win out. And radical defiance can never be translated into institutions and powers. In both cases, that makes libertarian pacifism all the more significant and necessary.

In sketching some limitations of libertarian pacifism, I have paradoxically suggested enlarging the position by accepting the limits of a protest movement. This way, I think, leads not just to negative views on mass and political movements, and some scepticism about nonviolent and liberal pacifist doctrines, but to exploration of other possibilities
The fallacy of non-violent defence

COLIN JOHNSON

This article was written partly to expose the naivety at present being offered by the peace movements in this country, as the solution to the most obvious manifestations of the warfare state, and partly because a deep-seated cynicism tells me, and I am sure many other anarchists, that if the Sunday Telegraph for one, thinks that "civilian defence" is worth propagating, there must be something wrong with it.

That non-violence is being considered seriously at grass roots as a means of defence may be inferred from Canon Collins' reply at the Annual Conference of CND in 1963, when he remarked upon the little that was known about non-violence as a means of defence, and that it would be just as wrong to lead people to suppose there was a non-violent defence against the bomb, when the Campaign had not got one, as it was to talk about "civil defence". . . Muddled as ever, but for once basically right.

Perhaps it is now apparent to the remaining supporters of the campaign that although "the bomb" may be the most immediate danger to humanity, it is certainly not the ultimate threat with which the governments of the world will confront their subjects. In this situation the movement for disarmament that is purely nuclear—although it is concerned with wider social issues—is probably too insular in its attempt to appreciate the society which gives rise to ultimate threats, to lay the principled foundation for a lasting solution to the problem of conflict resolution. However, the problem remains.

Anarchists believe that a non-authoritarian society could not produce these symptoms of the ultimate anti-social state, but must agree that to offer anarchism, as such, against all the ingrained social prejudices prevailing to the advantage of a central authority, is impractical, if not impossible. Therefore we also must find an alternative which will allow us to complete our task of social education.

The alternative that we offer must fulfil all the functions that war, as an anti-social institution does already fulfil. What is claimed to be the most comprehensive and up-to-date collection of work on the "alternative" (A Search for Alternatives to War and Violence, edited by Ted Dunn, 1963), indicates, through Gene Sharp, particularly, that a system of non-violent defence is the nearest approach that the peace movement can make to providing this alternative. (The recent, and similarly negatively biased Peace News pamphlet Civilian Defence emphasises this.) Gene Sharp considers what logically must be the situation if both America, the USSR and China continue to expand and to divide the world into "blocs" without actually causing a global war in the process. In an article entitled "Facing Totalitarianism Without War" he says:

War has in international relations relieved people of a sense of danger and given them a technique of defending and furthering their objectives. The mass of humanity has believed—and still believes—that no other techniques than violent struggle could be adequate in such a crisis. The alternative to war, they have believed, was impotence, cowardice and passive submission in face of threats to that which they have cherished. Peace workers, however, have often shown little awareness of the acute dangers posed by modern tyranny, and have generally offered no substitute for war in such crises. Yet, the realities of power and conflict being what they are, some ultimate sanction is necessary to deal with the political violence of tyranny.

After briefly touching on the range and type of power at the disposal of the future tyrant, he concludes that "the answer must lie in a peaceful counterpart of war, 'war without violence', by which people can defend liberty, their way of life and humanitarian principles when all other hopes have failed." This is non-violent action.

Most people would agree that a peaceful counterpart of war must be capable of defending the "group" values stated above. However, in spite of the phrase "non-violent action" it is clear that we would actually be in a state of non-violence if, in all cases, we saw with Gene Sharp's background quoted here that I wish to examine the validity of our current attitudes to non-violent defence.

We are told that non-violent action operates from a distinct assumption in political theory that all rulers are dependent for their power upon the co-operation, submission and obedience of their subjects. Thus, to be effective against a totalitarian regime, non-violent action must be directed at the sources of co-operation and submission. Recent history has shown that it is practically impossible to do this from "outside" the country or state in question, and that a movement of the type required to change a regime must be initiated by the people involved in it. Now the difficulties of this are apparent, because technology has provided already the means whereby the future tyrant will be able to ensure that this initiation does not arise. When Jefferson wrote, "We believe that man is a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights, and with an innate sense of justice . . .", the only organisation to have disproved this, crudely, but on a fairly large scale was the Church. Today the likelihood of being able to establish rights, rationally or justly, is diminishing in every part of the world.

This leads—and has led—to the problem of decreasing public control of, besides the means of mass destruction, the methods of public control. This process can be facilitated by methods we "have often shown little awareness of", the distraction and escapism provided by our various sports (most of which thrive on an aggressive spirit) and entertainments, together with the creation of false economic aims, i.e.
"production", to give examples which we have to contend with daily. Under a more totalitarian system these methods can be more openly reinforced by control of information and mass communication media. Albert Speer, Hitler's Minister for Armaments, said at his trial:

Hitler's dictatorship differed in one fundamental point from all its predecessors in history. It was the first dictatorship which made use of all technical means for the domination of its own country. Through technical devices like the radio and the loudspeaker, eighty million people were deprived of independent thought. It was thereby possible to subject them to the will of one man. . . . Earlier dictators needed highly qualified assistants at the lowest level—men who could think and act independently. The totalitarian system in the period of modern technical development can dispense with such men; thanks to modern methods of communication, it is possible to mechanise the lower leadership. As a result of this there has arisen the new type of the uncritical recipient of orders.

In extreme cases, which must exceed this one, we may expect to encounter (although we may not be aware of the actual encounter) such techniques as mild brainwashing, chemical persuasion (via physiologically cheap tranquillisers, intoxicants, and stimulants), plus their complements—subconscious persuasion and hypnopedia.

That these techniques lead to the rejection of what Gene Sharp calls "the realities of power", and also to the rejection of the assumption that the ruler depends upon the governed co-operating consciously in some degree (the reversal of this co-operation being the aim of non-violent action) can be shown by a brief examination of each of these techniques:

The effect that mild brainwashing can have is evident from the amount of money invested each year in "market creation" for largely useless and unnecessary products. In this context the reaction which market creation has on increasing the required per capita production out of all proportion to the satisfaction of human needs, has the obvious advantage of tending to enslave people to their own technology. Thus a circle is created, an important part of which is the institution of large centralised forces capable of disseminating ideas and "needs" quickly and efficiently, our likely future oppressors will use these forces to censor and distort and to appeal to our sub-conscious prejudices.

Chemical persuasion has not, so far as we know, been used in any attempt to control a modern society. but the Spanish had a comparatively easy time when conquering the Incas of Peru because of the almost universal addiction to cocaine in that society, and it is not beyond possibility that all that is required is to control the water supply of a civilised community. Induced mass temporary amnesia would be a useful political weapon which would save the re-writing of history that George Orwell found necessary in 1984. Among the chemicals which could be used in this way, and are fairly well-known, are the tranquillisers reserpine, chlorpromazine, and meprobamate (known as Miltown), lysergic acid diethylamide in one form or another which promises to be a harmless intoxicant, and iproniazid as a stimulant.

Experiments in sub-conscious perception conducted by an Austrian neurologist, Dr. Poetzel, in about the year 1918, have shown that an interposed image lasting for only a millisecond on a screen registers fully on the subconscious mind. This technique can also be used to project messages sonically which are outside the range of our subconscious hearing. Work has also been conducted in relation to this subconscious projection which shows that a static visual "key" can be used to invoke a subliminally imposed response. Thus people could be prepared for a number of situations in advance, unconsciously, and the appropriate response to a situation provoked when required.

Hypnopedia, that is the formation of attitude through constantly repeated phrases while the subject is asleep and therefore in a lowered state of psychological resistance, will provide a future tyrant with a means of re-conditioning someone who is "sick" or "insane", i.e. does not conform to the rest of his society. Recent experiments have shown current techniques to be less efficient than some might desire. But were it to be used as the complement of sensory deprivation of one sort or another its effects would be enhanced.

The Mind-Benders, a recent film, gave a meagre slant into the possibilities of sensory deprivation. Briefly, the "subject" is fitted with breathing apparatus and suspended, freely, in a large tank. He is clothed to prevent any sense of touch with his own body, to sound-proof him and to prevent light giving any sense of direction. Suspended in this void, and deprived of any incoming stimulus to mental activity his mind "begins to prey upon itself" and he is taken over by his own subconscious fantasies. An American officer working on this subject was quoted in one of the scientific weeklies as saying that "seven days of this treatment was equivalent to seven days brutal treatment for brainwashing purposes".

Supposing that our present awareness of principles can be termed absolute in reference to our society, it is these principles which motivate us when we protest or use non-violent action against a wrong or unjust situation. Given that the preceding techniques of mass control are valid and that their use can be expected, it is obvious that a population can have no absolute standard of reference for its principles or morals, except that which is given to them by their "controller". It seems that, if non-violent action is to be a valid means of defence against totalitarianism, we should explore its uses against a non-physically violent aggressor.

From the preceding however, it seems unlikely that, if we are considering the application of non-violent action for the defence of freedom, i.e. our current concept of absolute principles and morals in an active sense, we should be able to locate the true aggressor. It matters not a bit to whom one loses liberty, what does matter is being able to realise that freedom is being lost, how it is being lost, and the mechanics of remedying the situation.

I would suggest that if the obvious implications of the available methods of mass control are correct, we are justified on rejecting the theory that non-violence can be a valid means of defence against totalitarianism. Once a state of totalitarianism has been achieved, either from within or without a nation or state, and established, there will surely be no scope for action of any sort on a worthwhile scale; this being so, and if we accept the earlier assertion that a movement to
change any regime considered "bad" must be initiated from the inside, then the logical conclusion is that, once established, a modern technocratic dictatorship would be practically impossible to overcome by any means. It seems that the search for what has been called the ultimate sanction necessary to deal with the political violence of tyranny still eludes us. Does this mean that our theory of non-violence in a defensive situation is invalid? Obviously not for limited applications. Many people in this country, and in America particularly, have learned from Gandhi's lesson, that non-violent action can achieve specific aims, which are invariably limited in scope though not obviously defensive in content.

But if we are seeking a panacea for every situation in which conflicting views and interests give rise to the likelihood of violence, then I would suggest that we must add another dimension to our concept of non-violent action, essentially it is this: that if non-violent action is to be a valid method of defence, it must be used pre-emptively.

Action of this order, however, surely adds up to revolution. It implies the decision to dominate events rather than be dominated by them. This is borne out by the preceding examples mentioned of the limited scope of non-violent action. True, this demands a higher general level of "political appreciation" than at present prevails. Society as a whole, but in its individual parts, would be required to question continually its direction and needs, and be free to act upon its conclusions, either as a whole, or individually. Until we can provide conditions wherein each man is free and able to make directly the decisions about things which concern him, in all aspects of his life, we must concede the fallacy of non-violent defence.

Anarchists have always said that these conditions are the basic requirements for any worthwhile social relationship. But now we are faced with the absolute necessity of survival, both of body and mind, and must defend and enlarge what freedom we have, by limited non-violent actions against the state, constantly endeavouring to implicate people who otherwise "do not want to know".

In case this appears to be optimistic let us remember that there are already signs that an awareness among the unpolitical of their power over some aspect of their lives is spreading. There have been small but worthwhile applications of non-violent direct action over a large range of social questions.

It is by amplifying the underlying principles of these actions and making sure that the principles are understood that we can avoid totalitarianism, not, as we are being led to believe, by waiting for it to arrive, and then defending ourselves against it. And, "since we live under conditions of continuous war, peace is not something to be defended, it is to be newly created as an unprecedented condition of human kind". I am sure that a non-violent offensive, against all the minor and seemingly insignificant, as well as the major involvements that the state has arranged for us, is the only way to defend and create the revolution in values and society which we desire.

The Committee of 100 and anarchism

NICOLAS AND RUTH WALTER

IN HER ARTICLE "Anarchists and the Committee of 100" (ANARCHY 50), Diana Shelley came to the right conclusion—that the process was one of "exodus" rather than "influx", and that "many more anarchists came out of the Committee of 100 than ever went into it"—but in doing so she gave a false impression of the early period of the Committee which should be corrected before it becomes generally accepted.

To begin at the beginning, Diana Shelley is wrong about the origins of the Committee. It isn't true that "the Committee of 100 began as a purely breakaway movement from CND, and arose from a disagreement over tactics rather than aims". This was the attitude of some members, especially among the "names", but not of the Committee as such. It is true that "the whole image was far removed from that of the Direct Action Committee", but no further than it was from that of CND. It is true that "it looked at one point in 1960 as if CND might be persuaded to advocate and organise civil disobedience", but this never happened, and that was exactly why the Committee of 100 appealed both to CND supporters who weren't happy with constitutional methods and to DAC supporters who weren't happy with small numbers, as well as to unilateralists (like ourselves) who weren't happy with either CND or DAC.

The point of the Committee of 100 was that it was meant to be a new departure, but if anything it was a breakaway movement from DAC rather than from CND, and it always owed more to DAC than to CND. Its first Secretary came from DAC; its first two full-time workers were the Chairman and Secretary of DAC; it was joined by all but two of the members of DAC before its first demonstration in February 1961; between 40 and 50 per cent of the members of its Working Group during the first six months came from DAC; in March 1961 there was even some fear that it might be dominated by DAC; and in June 1961, after the first Holy Loch demonstration, it absorbed DAC.

The Committee's President, Bertrand Russell, and its Vice-President, Michael Scott, personified on one hand the double origin of the new organisation—with, however, a clear bias towards DAC—and on the other hand the moderation of its well-known members. It is important to realise that most of the "names" in the Committee always lagged behind the rank-and-file—hence the "hardly revolutionary" tone of the Russell-Scott manifesto Act or Perish, and the "respectable" image of the early Committee demonstrations, which concealed a revolutionary and hardly respectable purpose—and that the Committee of
100 began in effect as a “front” organisation. The “names” gave authority to a programme which might otherwise have been as timid as that of CND or as unpopular as that of DAC.

Incidentally, Ralph Schoeman can’t be taken as one of the “exceptions” to the “liberal” approach of the Committee—he was after all the main driving-force behind the formation of the Committee and behind its activity during its first year, and the approach of his Peace News articles (February 17th and August 25th, 1961) would have been shared by most of its members throughout that time. Nor can he be so easily distinguished from the “formal” anarchists, for he called himself an anarchist, and his general ideas were close to those of the other anarchists—“formal” and otherwise—in the Committee at that time.

Secondly, Diana Shelley is wrong about the attitude of the anarchist movement during the early period of the Committee of 100. It is true that “the editorials in FREEDOM were hardly a reflection of the feeling in and around the Committee.” But for one thing they weren’t intended to be, and for another they weren’t always a reflection of the feeling in and around the anarchist movement either. It isn’t true that the attitude to the Committee of the editors of FREEDOM “began as an aloof one”. They always supported the Committee of 100—as they had previously supported the Direct Action Committee—and they printed plenty of contributions showing that many anarchists were deeply committed to it.

During 1960, before the Committee had been formed, FREEDOM published several articles and letters suggesting that the next step for the unilateralist movement should be something more than what had yet been attempted by either CND or DAC: “Constitutional protest is ultimately useless, since it can be ignored . . . and unconstitutional protest based on civil disobedience is almost as useless, so long as the disobedience is too damned civil for words. Bearing witness is not enough. Nor is it enough to muster as many people as watched the Cup Final or filed past Princess Margaret’s wedding bouquet, if all they are going to do is to wave banners or listen to speeches. Sooner or later a great many laws must be broken by a great many people if anything radical is to be done on this island” (June 4th); “It is better to march against bombs than to talk or write against them, but it won’t in itself get rid of bombs. The only way to do that is to go and pull the bloody things to bits or bury them . . . . If only a march would just once turn into a mob and break into the Aldermaston establishment or the House of Commons, the marchers might realise their potentiality. For ultimately it is as futile to wave banners or to sit in the mud as it is to fight windmills with a lance . . . . Civil disobedience and passive resistance and hunger-strikes and marches and processions and so on are all very well. But in the end disobedience is nothing unless it is extremely uncivil. What are we waiting for?” (September 3rd).

The answer to that last question was, apparently, the Committee of 100, which was formed in the following month. The editors of FREEDOM welcomed its appearance: “A movement of civil disobedience will probably not succeed in removing the threat of nuclear weapons. But it may well do something to shake enough people in this country and the world into a new way of thinking” (November 5th). During 1961, when the Committee was riding high, they published many articles and letters about it. They printed Act or Perish, although it was “hardly revolutionary” (January 21st). Before the Committee’s first demonstration, they advised the readers of FREEDOM to “sit down—without illusions,” and added that “anarchists are very much in favour of movements which are prepared to engage in acts of civil disobedience” (February 18th). The main front-page article in the Aldermaston issue of FREEDOM that year was an account of the Committee of 100 by one of its anarchist members (April 1st). FREEDOM always devoted considerable space to favourable reports of the big Committee demonstrations (March 4th, May 6th, September 23rd, December 16th), just as they had done for the Direct Action Committee (January 17th, 1959, and January 9th, 1960). The editors of FREEDOM declared their support and solidarity when George Clark was imprisoned and Ralph Schoeman threatened with deportation (November 18th), and again when the Six were imprisoned (February 24th, 1962).

It is true that “FREEDOM argued strongly against the . . . belief in the value of being jailed” and was “unconvinced of the worth of the sit-down as a tactic”, but many members and supporters of the Committee felt the same. It is not quite true that “the only well-known anarchists who were originally members of the Committee faded from it just at the time when the action envisaged turned in more anarchistic directions.” Alex Comfort said at the first meeting of the Committee that he wouldn’t take part in its demonstrations, although he supported them (and remained a member until he had to accept a binding-over order in September 1961), and at the same meeting he advocated the “other activities in the movement” which he then turned to instead to be in good time for the Committee’s first demonstration. As for Herbert Read, he never tried to exert a specifically anarchist influence on the Committee, and always saw his part in it as that of a “name” giving authority to and sometimes taking part in large-scale set-pieces of straightforward civil disobedience (as on February 18th and September 17th, 1961).

Thirdly, Diana Shelley is wrong about the attitude of the Committee of 100 during its early period. It isn’t true that “the Committee of 100 evolved into a decisive and influential experiment in libertarian action,” or that “during the first year of its existence . . . the Committee took several steps in the direction of an anarchist position”. The Committee began as an organisation for libertarian action, and its position never changed.

John Morris’s article in Peace News (October 6th, 1961) gave a false impression of the early Committee meetings; the “series of clear, simple decisions, usually almost unanimous,” existed only in his imagination—in fact, the decisions of the Committee then, as since, were usually confused, complex, and far from unanimous, especially when there was a wide choice of projects. What happened after the first demonstration on February 18th was typical. On March 12th, there
were fifteen resolutions on future action, of which only two minor ones got a two-thirds majority; on May 7th, there were seven resolutions on future action, of which none got a two-thirds majority; on May 27th, there were nine resolutions on future action, of which only one got a two-thirds majority (this was for the September weekend of mass resistance against Polaris). Things were the same same at the beginning as they were one or two years later.

It may be true that the Committee’s “instinctive rejection of the apparatus of indirect democracy” and the “concepts of direct democracy” which it adopted instead seemed to John Morris—and even perhaps to “most supporters”—to be “new to modern political thought,” but he was wrong, for they were nothing of the kind. Nor, however, were they the result of any “anarchist principle of autonomous decentralisation”—at first they were the only way of organising civil disobedience demonstrations, and later they were the only way of keeping the movement going. Supporters were allowed to demonstrate as they wished, and regional Committees were allowed to set themselves up as they wished, not only because of principle, but also because they were going to do what they wanted anyway. The Committee always realised that it couldn’t hope to control its supporters on demonstrations, and the marshalling system was always felt to be unsatisfactory. In the same way, the Committee always realised that it couldn’t hope to control its supporters between demonstrations either, and the growth of the regional and local organisation was a result of this; during September 1961, the Working Group decided that “Committees should be formed as they crop up” (September 25th), and the Committee noted that “Committees of 100 are already being formed throughout the country whether we like it or not” (September 30th).

It isn’t true that “in terms of action, too, there was a move further away from conventional demonstrating towards a more anarchist approach”. As we have shown, the Committee always owed more to the DAC than to CND, and this can be seen in its discussions as well as its personnel. During the first few months of its life, the Committee considered demonstrating at “a rocket base”. Fylingdales, Woolwich, Aldermaston, Foulness, Holy Loch, Porton, and Imber, as well as in London. It went on demonstrating in London for so long not because it was “moderate” rather than “radical”, or “conventional” rather than “anarchist”, but because it was practical. After the first demonstration on February 18th, the Working Group decided “that, while the Committee should not confine its activities to London, the next two or three demonstrations might have to be in the London area because of the importance of ensuring really large numbers. . . . That direct action against nuclear bases and installations was necessary, but as such demonstrations were likely to involve smaller numbers their timing would have to be carefully planned so that they could not be written off as defeats for the Committee” (March 10th). Thus the decision to stay in London was tactical, not ideological, a matter of timing, not principle. The Committee always wanted to get on with direct action, but not until the right moment, and when at last it did so—on May 27th—this was not a move towards an anarchist approach,

but a decision that the right moment had come.

So it isn’t true that the idea of “combining the direct action of the DAC with the numbers of ‘mass’ civil disobedience” came after the Trafalgar Square demonstration on September 17th, 1961. This idea was one of the fundamentals of the Committee, it was the constant preoccupation of the Committee, and it was put into practice by the Committee on the day before the Trafalgar Square demonstration. It is true that “the Wethersfield demonstration was radical, when compared with the Committee’s previous activities,” but it wasn’t as radical as all that. There was no “disregard for property, involved in climbing fences and walking on”—on the contrary, the Committee specifically asked demonstrators not to climb fences or damage property in any way. It was not the first time the Committee had challenged “a law with more serious penalties than that of obstruction”—there had always been the common laws of conspiracy and of incitement (for which George Clark had got nine months), and in September there had also been the Justices of the Peace Act and the Public Order Act (both carrying a maximum penalty of six months). Nor was Wethersfield the first time the Committee had attempted “the real physical obstruction of the State’s weapons of war as opposed to symbolic obstruction outside the ministries which ostensibly controlled the weapons”—it had organised a demonstration at the Holy Loch on September 16th and 17th, when there were at least four times as many demonstrators as at the Wethersfield demonstration three months later.

The Wethersfield demonstration was a failure not only because many of the people who had made the Trafalgar Square demonstration a success were not prepared to go to a nuclear base, but also because many demonstrators went to Ruislip instead (thus one of us went to Wethersfield, and the other to Ruislip); and the Committee’s mistake was not so much that it decided to go to Wethersfield as that it decided to go to Ruislip on the same day. Many of the people who had made the Trafalgar Square demonstration a success were quite prepared to go to a nuclear base, but they took the easier choice and went to the demonstration nearer London. Wethersfield—and—Ruislip was a failure, but either Wethersfield or Ruislip might well have been a success.

It may be true that “the arrest and trial of the Six showed up still further how marginal the influence of anarchist thinking was on the majority of supporters,” but surely not in the ways suggested. It is difficult to believe that any genuine supporters of the Committee would really have turned Pat Pottle over to the police “with easy consciences”, and it should be remembered that the Committee issued a statement supporting his decision to go on the run; indeed, one of the most significant things about this episode was that so many Committee people did support him. The reason why “the only action advocated to help the Six” was “the rather ridiculous one of supporters lining up outside police stations to confess their shared guilt and ask for retribution” was that the Six didn’t want any more help, and preferred the Committee to get on with its job; the Committee naturally didn’t want either to
flout their wishes, or to jeopardise their slight chance of getting off. The reason why "the only protest" against the imprisonment of the Six was "a rally in Trafalgar Square" was that Pat Arrowsmith's proposal to return to Wethersfield was rejected by overwhelming majorities, first by the Committee (January 28th, 1962), and then by its supporters (February 9th); this may have been a "failure of nerve", but it may have been a recognition of reality. Anyway, the wish to do more than this was not anarchist—there were anarchists on both sides—and the decision to do no more than this didn't prove that the Committee was "a still essentially bourgeois-minded movement" (whatever that means); it was after all prepared to do a lot more than any other organisation.

Incidentally, we aren't happy about the attempt to distinguish between Committee demonstrations that were "anarchist" and those that were not. It wasn't more anarchist for the Committee to demonstrate at the Holy Loch and Wethersfield rather than in Whitehall or Trafalgar Square—it could even be argued that it was less anarchist to do so, since there was the implication that the problem of nuclear war was military rather than political. FREEDOM, after all, didn't prefer one kind of demonstration to another, and would always have preferred an industrial campaign to either: "Is it not time that all the goodwill present at those demonstrations be used to persuade our fellow-workers to refuse to sell their labour to the merchants of death?" (April 1st, 1961).

Finally, Diana Shelley is wrong about the part played by anarchists in the Committee of 100 during the early period. From the beginning, many people in and around the Committee were what Alan Lovell called "emotional anarchists"; but it was significant that when he described this phenomenon it was not in an anarchist paper but in the New Left Review (No 8, March-April, 1961), and that he added that "the formal anarchist movement in this country is totally useless and an absolute disaster for any kind of serious anarchist thinking". Now whether he really meant this or not—he was certainly more charitable when he wrote about the Direct Action Committee two years earlier in the Universities & Left Review (No 6, Spring 1959), and when he spoke two months later to the London Anarchists (May 14th, 1961)—the important thing was that, as one of the most influential members of the Committee of 100 at that time, he was typical of the many Committee people who could be labelled as anarchists but were indifferent or actually hostile to the anarchist movement; some of them objected to being labelled as anarchists at all, and to avoid confusion it might almost be better not to call them anarchists—like the groups which appeared all over the country during 1962 and 1963, they were perhaps "libertarian rather than strictly anarchist".

These emotional anarchists or libertarians were a permanent section of the rank-and-file of the Committee. They were the successors of—and in some cases the same as—a similar section of the rank-and-file of the Direct Action Committee. Thus of the two-thirds of the North Pickenham demonstrators who answered a questionnaire in December 1958, 3 per cent supported pacifist parties, 7 per cent supported the Communist Party, 23 per cent supported the Labour and Co-operative Parties, and as many as 67 per cent supported no party (Peace News, January 2nd, 1959). This section was the main source of anarchist influence in the Committee, and in a sense it inoculated the Committee against the influence of the "formal" anarchists, as represented by FREEDOM. When special articles about the Committee appeared in Peace News—especially "The Relevance of Resistance" (September 15th, 1961) and "The Committee of 100 and a New Political Basis" (September 22nd)—or in Solidarity—especially "From Civil Disobedience to Social Revolution" (Vol 1, No 8), "Civil Disobedience and the Working Class" (Vol 1, No 9), and "Civil Disobedience and the State" (Vol 1, No 10)—they were based on close knowledge of Committee affairs, and were read by a large number of Committee people. By contrast, when special articles about the Committee appeared in FREEDOM—especially the "Inquest on the Sit-Down" series (December 16th and 23rd, 1961, and January 6th, 1962)—they were based only on outside observation of Committee affairs, and were read by only a small number of Committee people. Even when ANARCHY published special articles about the Committee which were based to a greater extent on inside knowledge of Committee affairs—especially in the issues on "Direct Action" (No 13, March 1962) and "Disobedience" (No 14, April 1962)—they still appealed mostly to people on the fringes of the Committee, and when they appealed to people closer to the Committee, this was usually because they were also based to a great extent on Committee rather than specifically anarchist ideas.

The trouble was that the editors of FREEDOM—and the leaders of the anarchism movement in general—were not so much aloof from the Committee of 100 as out of touch with it; they were interested all right, but not involved. The result was that many of the Committee people who accepted the anarchist label and even joined the anarchist movement did so in spite of rather than because of the efforts of "formal" anarchists. The important thing about most of the Committee anarchists during the early period was that they didn't really care whether they were anarchists or not. At that time the question either didn't arise or wasn't worth bothering about. In joining the Committee they had at last freed themselves from the various movements of traditional politics, and another movement with a traditional ideology and a traditional organisation—even if these were actually similar to their own ideology and organisation—meant nothing to them. Their anarchism was a brand-new, do-it-yourself, instant anarchism. If they were told that they were closer to Bakunin than to Marx, they would say "So what?"—and they were right. The important question wasn't whether such a statement was true or whether it was relevant; and in the early period of the Committee it was completely irrelevant. That was a time for action, not argument: for movement, not a movement: for propaganda by deed, not word.

The Committee anarchists couldn't be distinguished from their comrades by being more "radical". Pat Arrowsmith, who was probably the most radical personality in the Committee, was never an anarchist.
The Committee anarchists were like the Committee socialists and the Committee pacifists. In nearly every question of organisation or action, there were anarchists on both sides, socialists on both sides, and pacifists on both sides. The Committee of 100 was an ideological no-man's-land. You were identified not by your uniform but by your behaviour, not by what you might say but by what you would do. This was true as long as the Committee held the initiative. When the Committee lost the initiative, during 1962 and 1963, many Committee anarchists joined the anarchist movement; but many did not, because they still didn't really care whether they were anarchists or not. They were still indifferent or actually hostile to the anarchist movement; and some of them still objected to being labelled as anarchists at all.

The emotional anarchists or libertarians are still there. Some are still active in the Committee; some are working for Peace News or Solidarity, or—since 1963—Resistance. Some read FREEDOM and ANARCHY; some do not. We are typical of the ambivalent relationship between the Committee of 100 and anarchism. One of us went into the Committee from the anarchist movement, and the other moved towards an anarchist position while working in the Committee; one of us accepts the anarchist label, and the other rejects it—though we seldom disagree about action. At the moment, neither of us is happy either with the Committee of 100 or with the anarchist movement. But we are both worried by the suggestion in the last sentence of Diana Shelley's article—that "this may be the time for the race anarchist infiltration". On the contrary, anything of the kind would do no good either to the Committee of 100 or to the anarchist movement, or—which is more important—to the cause we are all working for.

### Automation & individualism

**FRANCIS ELLINGHAM**

ASK ANY IDEALISTIC ADVOCATE OF AUTOMATION, from Sir Leon Bagrit to an anarchist-communist, why he thinks automation is such a wonderful thing. He will inevitably reply that automation, and only automation, can at last make possible his pet conception of the good life for man—the free life, the civilized life, the fully human life, or whatever. Thus, in ANARCHY 49 on automation, George and Louise Crowley wrote:

"The coming change, as we see it, will bring man from a condition in which he can maintain society only through the coercive institutions of government and law to a state of humanness wherein all such institutionalised constraints will become unnecessary and will vanish. The individual man has long found them irksome; his more or less reluctant acceptance of them derives from his recognition of the advantageousness of the social order, and conviction that constraint is indispensable to its functioning. We grant that it has been so but believe that this revolution, if it is fully consummated, will virtually remove the element of interest from man's environment. In freer interaction, the humanist ideal can be realised." (p76).

And at the end of his first Reith Lecture Sir Leon Bagrit said:—

I am convinced that automation has only one real purpose, which is to help man to become a full human being. I have always been impressed by the ideal of the complete man which was set down 400 years ago by Castiglione in his book The Courtier. Although the details may be different today from those of the sixteenth century, the fundamental concept is the same, that in order to be a full man you have to build yourself from a varied man. Your mind has to be adequately cultivated and your body has to be adequately developed and trained. This is the concept which the Greeks had, too. But the high level reached by Greek civilization was only possible because the routine, dulling work was done by slaves, who were not even regarded as human beings: they were looked upon as machines.... Today, if we use the slave services of automation intelligently and creatively, we have the chance of building a really high civilization for ourselves. And when I say for ourselves, I mean the whole community, not just for a small elite on the Greek pattern. This is the essential purpose of automation."

Now, it was against such idealistic humanism that Max Stirner, the pioneer of individualist-anarchism, levelled his bitterest accusations. In his main work, The Ego and His Own, Stirner protested with all his might against the notion that man has a destiny, calling, or task to become "a full human being", or to live any particular kind of "good life".

In Stirner's view there is no good life for man, apart from the life he is already living. Yet if only he realizes this, man's life is indeed good, in the sense that he enjoys peace of mind. Thus an individualist-anarchist does not depend on the success of mass movements, on the establishment of this or that social system, or on the transformation of his economic circumstances by modern technology. He can live his good life now, in any circumstances, even in a prison cell. To quote Stirner again: "He does not need to free himself first, because at the start he rejects everything outside himself, because he prizes nothing more than himself, rates nothing higher...." This is not mere selfishness, as naive critics may suppose. It is what a Taoist or Zen Buddhist might call "non-attachment"—that is, detachment from all externals, all worldly goods. Naturally, even an individualist prefers to be rich rather than poor, leisureed rather than overworked, and consequently he may try to improve his lot. But he does not regard any particular conditions as indispensable for the good life, nor does he find menial work necessarily "dulling". Come what may—even the very worst—he possesses, so long as he lives, what Stirner called "the consciousness of egoism"; that means the understanding that all his behaviour springs naturally and spontaneously from himself, that he cannot behave in any other way, and that the whole course of his life must therefore be accepted as being, in a sense, inevitable.

This calm, liberated state of mind—which menial work may actually help him to attain—is the only "good life" known to the individualist. But he never forces it on others. If he makes propaganda, it is either out of sheer exuberance—out of a natural desire to tell others about his new way of looking at life—or else in self-defence against those who want to force their ideas on him.
Any concept of the good life which includes automation as an indispensable element, can only appear to the individualist-anarchist as a form of attachment to externals, or, in Stirner's phraseology, as a form of “possessedness”. There are two alternatives for man. Either he accepts and trusts himself as he functions naturally, moment by moment, and faces the future with a sane “sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof”. Or else he does not trust his natural self, but tries to make his life conform to some ideal plan, so that he cannot face the future without anxiety: he becomes possessed by the idea that the plan must be fulfilled. Automation, and technological progress in general, have come to “possess” almost everybody in that way. It is said everywhere that “you can’t stop progress”, that automation is coming whether we like it or not, and that we must all be ready to make whatever personal sacrifices it may require. What is this but the most abject abasement of man before “things outside himself”? Instead of “rating nothing higher than himself”, man has become hypnotized by the “feed-back” system and the computer. “If we know where we are going,” says Sir Leon Bagrit, “and if we use the slave services of automation intelligently and courageously...” but there’s the rub. We don’t know where we are going, because instead of putting ourselves first, we are blindly following “progress”. Automation will use us, and we shall be the slaves.

But (it may be objected) does automation have to be an idolatrous cult? Granted that the idealistic advocates of automation, who regard it as indispensable, are “attached to externals” and want to impose their “godhead” on others—is it not still possible to favour automation for sensible, practical, and non-authoritarian reasons? Even an individualist-anarchist, presumably, might find automation useful without regarding it as indispensable. Indeed, if a number of individualists felt it “natural” to build an automated factory for their own mutual benefit, would it not be a “betrayal of man’s natural self” if they failed to do so? And, after all, a minimum of material prosperity is surely indispensable even for the “good life” of the individualist, since without food he would die and have no life at all. He cannot, in practice, be utterly detached from all externals.

Such objections show a complete misunderstanding, both of the automation-revolution and of non-attachment. To take the second point first, nobody denies that a minimum of wealth is essential for physical life (though whether it is so for consciousness is a moot point: the materialists assume that a brain produces consciousness, but it is no more far-fetched to assume that it only transmits it). But the whole point of non-attachment is that you do not regard anything as indispensable, not even the basic necessities of life. If those necessities are available, well and good. But if, despite all your natural efforts, they are not available—well and good too. Not even non-attachment is regarded as indispensable. If you become non-attached, as a result of your natural self-development, that is excellent. But if your behaviour so far has not been very non-attached, that is excellent too, since it is only natural and unavoidable. Yet once you have accepted your own attachment, that is non-attachment! It is the attempt to control one’s natural life-process, to make it conform to some plan (whether the plan is to become non-attached or simply to stay alive) which constitutes attachment to “things outside oneself”. Thus nobody afraid to die, or afraid of attachment, can fully attain the “consciousness of egoism”. Stirner regarded both the avaricious man and the would-be saint as equally “possessed”.

As for the other objection, it is really fatuous to talk about individualists building automated factories, or using automation for their own ends, as if the whole automation-revolution were controllable by individualists, or as if automation were going to be laid on especially for their benefit. Automation may not logically have to be an idolatrous cult, but it certainly will be in practice. The automation-revolution will be carried out by men who detest everything individualism stands for, who will do their best to eradicate every trace of it, and who will probably succeed. Here and there, perhaps, a few individualists may contrive to go on living, and, if so, it is possible they might use automation—just as an individualist nowadays may use the electric light, however much he may deplore the technological idolatry which, as a matter of historical fact, has led to the mass-distribution of electricity. But any individualist who supported the automation-revolution in the hope of getting new gadgets for individualist purposes, would be a fool. Individualism, if it survives at all, will lose immeasurably more than it will gain by the automation-revolution, just as it has lost far more than it has gained by the whole industrial revolution to date. Modern man is an alienated, regimented, dependent upon things outside himself and therefore uncertain of himself. As he grows ever more possessed by “progress”, ever more alienated from his real self, so he will become ever less secure, ever less capable of adopting an independent, individualistic attitude to life. The more “progress”, the less individualism.

There is not the slightest sign that the automation-revolution will be controlled by genuinely non-attached people, motivated by a concern for the individual as such—the only sort of people to whom the fantastic potentialities of modern technology could safely be entrusted (and who would almost certainly regard the complete abolition of work as extremely unhealthy in any case). Instead, the controllers of the new order, like those of the present one, will be power-maniacs, and the motive behind the “progress” of the future will be the same as the motive behind that of the past—mass greed. For if the masses want automation, and are prepared to endure all the radical changes it will necessitate, it is only because, like the poor and downtrodden of every age, they identify the good life with a childish dream of the rich and idle life, a dream which they expect to come true in the end. Idealistic humanists may try to dress up this pathetic dream in high-flown language, but even the subtleties of a Reith Lecturer cannot disguise its real nature. It was very significant that Sir Leon Bagrit tried to justify automation by reference to the superficial, ephemeral ideals of the Renaissance and of ancient Greece—ideals formulated by rich, ruling classes to justify their particular appetites and worldly interests. He did not refer (in what is still officially a Christian country) to the New
Testament, or to the profound, age-old concept of non-attachment, which is found at the heart of all the great religions and in several important atheistic philosophies too. Non-attachment is clearly unmentionable in a series of talks whose sole purpose is to encourage the listeners to become more and more enthralled by the prospect of unprecedented material wealth. Indeed, in the age of automation, non-attachment will be the unforgivable sin, because the simple, natural behaviour of a non-attached person would expose the superficiality, the fundamental irrelevance of all technological achievements.

Quite accidentally, Sir Leon Bagrit revealed the ultimate fate of non-attachment, and of all it entails, when he remarked in his final lecture: "I believe that within twenty-five years automation will have made the old concept of charity obsolete." Sir Leon was using the word "charity" in a narrow, pejorative sense, meaning gifts of money which it is shameful to receive because they have not been earned. But his remark was startling, because that sense of the word is in fact comparatively recent. Its old, original sense was the Christian one, in which it means love of one's fellow men. How significant was Sir Leon's inaccuracy here? For charity in the good, old sense, if it is genuine and not just a pharisaical imitation, can only come from non-attachment—from that free state of mind in which one's own interests no longer seem of paramount importance. But since non-attachment, as we have just seen, will be the unforgivable sin in the age of automation, it follows that the old concept of charity will indeed become obsolete. A man will become as heartless as the cyberrated machines on which, like a spoilt, insecure child, he will be utterly and abjectly dependent. Such will be the "full human being" of the Reith Lectures.

As for George and Louise Crowley, we can now refute their theories too. They imagine that when automation has "removed the element of interest-conflict from man's environment", the golden age of freedom from government will inevitably follow. But "the element of interest-conflict"—which presumably means the element which gives rise to conflicting interests—does not actually lie in man's environment. It lies in his own mind. The Crowleys would probably say that men quarrel because of the scarcity of material goods. But however scarce material goods may be, there is no necessity for men to come into conflict over their distribution. Sane men—non-attached men—will always realize that fighting is as wasteful as it is degrading, and share their resources, however meagre, by friendly agreement. It is "attachment" to material goods, and also to certain non-material things which automation can never supply—such as prestige, status, and, above all, power—it is "possessedness" which causes men to have conflicting interests. If automation encourages "possessedness", and makes non-attachment obsolete, we must therefore expect men to become even more quarrelsome than they are already. Material goods may be as free and plentiful as air, but without non-attachment there can be no peace of mind, no wisdom, and, as we have seen, no charity. Anybody expecting a golden age of freedom in such conditions is entirely ignorant of human nature.

Automation and work

The proposals of the Memorandum on the Triple Revolution have naturally been received with a mixture of dissent and criticism by the majority of American public opinion, for they challenge so many aspects of our conventional wisdom. The idea of work has had such prominence for such a long time in human history that a valid comparison may be made with the idea of God: both can be traced to a common primeval condition of ignorance, fear and scarcity; no wonder that both were eventually joined in a common instrument of worship, organised religion. The inherent sanctity and the depth to which these two ideas have been inculcated in our minds is hard to comprehend until we are faced with a radical alternative. For a great many people, a person who does not believe in God is by definition incapable of "believing" in anything or holding "values" of any sort. Similarly a person who does not believe in self-support is by definition an immoral individual trying to live on other people's backs, and incapable of finding any "meaning" or "responsibility" in life. The primitive, negative image of God as an instrument of fear and submission is
still maintained in spite of overwhelming evidence of better methods of educating human beings and enhancing the positive perception of values and of life itself. Likewise, the primitive, negative image of work as a rigid, inescapable moral obligation is being maintained in spite of the equally overwhelming evidence that an increasing portion of our energies can be devoted to less "productive" and more "human" interests and activities—that work itself may eventually become a matter of periodic individual choice and not a permanent, universal, enslaving obligation. A British theologian said recently that we must "face the fact" that there is a large number of people who do not believe in God but who nevertheless live by high moral standards and that a new approach was required to conciliate the religious and the humanistic outlook. A similar statement is still pending with regard to the belief in work and its significance in modern society.

One must not be too critical in judging the slowness of emotional adjustment to the new circumstances. After all, it is all happening with such speed that people have literally no time to think about, and much less, to modify the venerable values they have been living with for thousands of years. Procreation has traditionally and universally been considered a blessing, and suddenly we find ourselves in the desperate situation of having to "control" it somehow, or sink into sub-human levels of crime and hardship. War was traditionally considered an inevitable evil, a periodic disaster which happened from time to time throughout history, a part of "human nature"; and all of a sudden we find that there simply cannot be any more wars—we have to "choose between peace in the world or the world in pieces". Industrial development has been considered for over a century and a half as a "natural", "inevitable" result of human progress, as something which would eventually and surely fit into the frame of existing social institutions, that would in no way challenge the fundamental values and criteria of our society; and yet, here we are in the midst of an incredibly rapid "technological explosion" which threatens to submerge us in absolute despair—unless we devise urgently a radical departure from existing social structures and patterns of thinking.

What are the facts about this technological explosion, and what are the proposals to deal with it? I am afraid that, in spite of the fertile discussion which is raging on this subject, there is a striking lack of up-to-date information: people at large find it difficult to follow current facts and figures, and these change from day to day, with the result that many of us keep on thinking in terms that may have been "adequate" only ten or even five years ago. We have seen the initial stages of the so-called Industrial Revolution, with all its toll of human misery, which we eventually survived to enter a new era of wealth and abundance for many. We have seen the birth of the assembly line and even the early "automated" factories, a few decades ago, and we happily noted that, after a period of commotion and upheaval, the "system" wound up by developing new jobs and better opportunities for everybody. Many of us still think that the present "cybernetic" revolution will be just another stage of this hide-and-seek game which mankind has been playing over cybernation is coming along as the "ultimate" instrument of production which is making our present mechanism of distribution, not only inadequate and inhuman, but simply unsustainable.

Cybernation means the control of industrial processes by means of electronic "brains" which run the machines and turn out the finished articles in a factory—with no human intervention whatever. It is a common argument that we still need "people" to tell the machines "what" to do—to design and set in motion the whole process. Of course we need some human intervention, but this is limited to a few highly specialised engineers and technicians whose responsibility is largely of a supervisory nature: the bulk of the human labour force is eliminated. A strictly technical estimate shows that only two per cent of the people now employed in industry would be sufficient to run a fully "automated" industrial economy, which means that the remaining 98 per cent of our present labour force would become progressively unemployed as automation develops.

The bewildering contradiction in our existing economic system can be summarised in the following statement: We have reached a stage of technological progress whereby we are potentially capable of providing to each human being what he needs for a decent living, with a minimum of work, or no work at all; yet the distribution of such wealth is still conditioned by our moral assumption that every individual must "earn his living" in order to justify his share of the national pie. For an increasing number of persons who are being eliminated from the productive process by automation, or who never had a fair chance of fitting into the industrial mechanism, this means being doomed to poverty and frustration in the midst of potential abundance; and any effort to "create employment" artificially is only a tribute to the nonsense of our puritanical morality.

Historically, the chronic problem of every human struggle has been "production", or scarcity. Now, for the first time in history this fundamental notion is being turned upside down, and our main problem becomes "distribution". In a more primitive, more tribal, or just more human, society, distribution would be no problem at all, for the commonwealth would be simply and spontaneously made available to every individual as a member of the family; but in our complicated, selfish, possessive society, in which the right to live is still subject to the fiction of self-support, the very idea of assuring to every individual his living as a matter of right comes as a sort of shock, a moral trauma which a great many of us try to resist with desperate rationalisation. Having been raised upon the principle that the good life was a life of toil and suffering, we've become so masochistic that we refuse to admit that there would be anything "good" in a life from which toil and suffering were eliminated. Faced by the prospect of a "life without work", we refuse to look at the positive aspects of human liberty and individual development which may thus be achieved, and we concentrate instead upon the "emptiness" and "boredom" of an existence in which the individual would no longer face the struggle for self-support. Even when genuinely concerned about a "balanced"
outlook on life, most of us naturally assume that such a "balance" must above all be assured by a substantial dead weight of honest-to-God work, or else the whole of life would lose its "significance". Our intimate humanity has been so thoroughly devastated by centuries of "civilisation" that we must really and truly be taught to live again, and it is quite understandable that this may throw a great many of us into genuine panic.

Essentially hence, the proposal of the memorandum on the Triple Revolution is a moral one, for its technological aspect need not be discussed. The proposal suggests that, since modern technology is capable of supplying enough goods for all to live in decent comfort, society should undertake an unqualified commitment to assure to every individual an "adequate income" as a matter of right, whether "employed" or not. The exact amount of such income, we may assume, would not necessarily cover all and every human desire or ambition: it would basically aim at removing the tension, the worry and the insecurity from human existence. It doesn't necessarily follow that there would be no more work of any sort to perform; no one is trying to say that people would be prevented from lifting a finger to carry out the innumerable "menial chores" like cooking meals, washing dishes, cleaning the house and similar purely "individual" functions. And no one is trying to say that every aspect of production and distribution would henceforth run without any human intervention at all: a fully automated economy would still require the two per cent of labour to be performed by engineers and technicians, and probably another five or 10 percent to take care of all other activities of transportation and distribution, agriculture included. (The "distribution" aspect of our present economy is a vastly sophisticated mechanism geared to suit the principles of scarcity, profit and employment; in an economy of technological abundance, "distribution" could be channelled in much simpler and more efficient ways than it happens to be nowadays.) But whatever the actual extent of human intervention, the fact remains that "work" in such conditions can truly become a matter of individual choice and need not be considered as a predominant moral obligation. People might still engage in certain types of work during certain periods out of sheer interest and curiosity, as a sort of "vacation" or a meaningful experience; but they would no longer be required to toil all their life in order to "earn a living". In other words the amount of human labour required to cope with the needs of an automated economy would be truly insignificant, and may hence be secured by means of "volunteer labour", as it were—the total manpower need not be permanently mobilised, and yet the needs of all would be adequately covered.

The elementary logic of this arrangement should be so evident to any reasonably intelligent person that it seems incredible to note the angry reaction of so many people in America to the Triple Revolution proposal. The clue to such reactions cannot be found in an objective analysis of facts and possibilities, but in deeply rooted, subconscious, irrational, "moral" premises and preconceptions which the new approach threatens to turn upside down. These critical reactions are generally polarised around two major stumbling blocks which prevent a clear understanding of the whole issue.

One of these is the question of "taxation", or using somebody else's money to provide the "lazy guys" a living. In referring to a "guaranteed annual income" for everybody, as the Triple Revolution proposal does, the idea gets inevitably associated with the traditional notion of "money" that we have been brought up on: namely, as the thing to be "honestly earned" with one's own sweat and effort.

Consequently the idea of taxing somebody's hard-earned money in order to maintain someone else without work (as a "drone", to use the emotionally-packed expression currently used in this connection) sounds like an insult to human dignity and liberty. The objection most frequently voiced by the critics is that if an annual income were actually guaranteed to everybody without work, where would the money come from to pay everybody his "income", or who would bother to do any work at all?

This very question only confirms how deeply misinformed and misled people are about "money". We have been so brainwashed by the abstractions of "honest money", "gold backing" and the like, that we still keep thinking of money as a true measure of human toil and therefore as a sacred value of its own. But what happens if goods are produced without human labour at all? Obviously "money" becomes only a secondary instrument of distribution, something that can and must be issued only in proportion to the goods available—but not in proportion to the amount of "labour" invested in their production. As human work required to run the economy gradually approaches nil, money ceases to be a measure of individual reward or even an incentive of production, and becomes a social instrument in making the wealth produced equitably accessible to all. It is consequently pure nonsense to speak of "taxes" as a source of "guaranteed income" for everybody: such "income" would be plain printed paper, issued as a plain symbolic qualification for each individual to "consume" a certain amount of goods which an automated economy is producing anyway—with a minimum or no human effort at all.

The second stumbling block in this discussion is, of course, the question of "centralisation", or the alleged loss of individual freedom if a central agency is to take care of issuing the annual income to every citizen and planning all production. This objection again shows a lack of understanding of automation itself. In a production mechanism virtually unhampered by "scarcity" and largely governed by machines themselves, it is nonsense to speak of a human bureaucracy with powers to dictate or to restrict individual action. Nor should this be viewed as a monstrous projection of a totally "mechanized", planned and standardized society in which all human differences would be ignored or eliminated: a fear that might be justified in the existing society of compulsive employment and acceptance of mass standards. The fact is that a "guaranteed annual income" agreed upon a national basis, would set only a bottom limit to what every human being is entitled as
a matter of right, but would in no case put a “ceiling” to individual achievement, nor would it prevent the individual from using his time and ingenuity in whatever way he finds best to improve his personal condition. It is the local community that would have the liberty and the power to plan its own development and place its own “orders” for whatever supplies may be needed locally, to the central production facilities. In other words, once we stop considering the role of government in the traditional, coercive sense, and once we accept the existence of a central co-ordinating agency for the sole purpose of ensuring an adequate distribution of technologically-produced wealth, where and as required by local bodies themselves, the whole subject of “power” and “coercion” and “centralisation” becomes meaningless.

This does not mean that I accept the Triple Revolution memorandum as the perfect and final outcome of a better society. I think it falls short of defining a genuine “vital standard” in terms of physical goods and facilities that ought to be made available to every individual, rather than in terms of an abstract “income”. I also think it vague and ambiguous in its approach to a “transition period” between the present economy based on full employment and the new structure of income without work. The principle of guaranteed income through technological abundance obviously marks the end of the so-called free enterprise system involving private ownership of production facilities and their utilisation for individual profit. The operation of an automated economy necessarily implies a “socialised” status of production—and yet this is something quite different from the orthodox Marxist or socialist postulates of “collective property”. When the need of human effort has been virtually eliminated, the whole notion of “property” becomes meaningless, or rather our main concern shifts from owning the means to distributing the final products. Cybernetics actually marks the end of both capitalism and socialism in the traditional interpretation. This is a major ideological point, but the Triple Revolution memorandum has failed to highlight it; in avoiding an outspoken statement about the end of capitalism made inevitable by total automation, it merely lends itself to undeserved criticism for proposing an old-fashioned brand of utopianism. Another more serious criticism of the Triple Revolution is that its authors rely almost entirely on a final stage of total cybernation to trigger off the needed transformation of present society—and in so doing ignore the latent possibilities of achieving a decent “vital standard” in the less developed countries where such a standard could and ought to be achieved right now—that is, long before the stage of total automation—even though it may still require human toil.

But whatever the limitations and shortcomings of this document, it has the merit of forcing us to review some of the most basic premises upon which our traditional economy has been based so far, in order to adjust and assimilate the enormous possibilities of technological development. Unless, of course, we deliberately choose to ignore such development and thereby shrink into isolation and stagnation, mental as well as physical, in an attempt to preserve obsolete values and patterns of living.

**OBSERVATIONS ON ANARCHY 47:**

**JAMES GILLESPIE REPLIES**

The comments on my essay, “Towards Freedom in Work” are interesting, but I should have liked to see some opinions on the following:

1. The abolition, or at least modification, of individual piecework and bonus and the laying of a proper groundwork for fellowship in and through work, and the contract system.
2. The notion of primary workers appointing labour foremen.
3. The free group idea.
4. The idea of work as a psychological necessity, as well as a means to income.

Maurice Goldman has said a lot about this but I must admit, in spite of my considerable experience of practical psychoanalysis, that he has me bemused and confused. His accusations are that I have forsaken the notion of being happy, that I have not dealt with the relationship of play to work, that, by implication, I have not kept in touch with what he calls “the unconscious of the mind” and am thus not a “revolutionary”, that I believe there is a “work instinct”, that I have come to terms with reality and have lost my utopian horizon. I do wish Maurice had taken the quotation from Freud (and from Jung and Fromm) and shown clearly that Freud was wrong in his stress on the psychological value of work (in community). Throwing verbose brickbats at me doesn’t help the cause of fellowship in work; certainly, after reading Maurice’s contribution I wondered if the editor had slipped me a doctored copy of ANARCHY and sent him quite a different copy. Anyway, thank you Maurice.

Colin Johnson has the notion that I am afraid of automation and makes a large, vague statement that my attitude, perhaps, is a “sub-conscious expression of a vested interest” which lurks serpent-like in my unconscious. I am aware of many ugly compulsions in my unc., and try to modify them (not very well), but as an unemployed pensioner, not welcomed with open arms by managers and employers, whether pro- or anti automation, I think this particular piece of “psychoanalysis at a distance” is a wee bit thick. Again, the statement that I seem to be comforted by the fact that only about 50% of production is likely to be subject to full automation, is not worth discussion.

Tony Smythe seems to have kept to the point fairly well, but his stress in large part is on ownership. In the long run I agree with small community ownership, but in the meantime, if a group of workers (managers, primary workers, etc.) rented capital goods and conducted a business on active democratic lines, would that be democratic practice? I agree with the value of ownership, but it is not a prime necessity in democratic operation.

I agree heartily with Tony Smythe that a programme for sharing power in work is essential.

Reg Wright’s contribution is to the point on the whole. But I
should like to know if the management structure at Standard under Leyland ownership is the same as that described by Melman, and what is the present ratio of administrative workers to production workers. Or is there an orthodox management structure with a gang bonus system in operation? I tried to get in touch with Reg Wright before my essay was published, but failed. However, it would be interesting to know if the shop or union stewards still carry out functions which are usually the province of orthodox management, and if so, what are these functions.

I am grateful to those who gave some time to giving a pat or having a bash. But where are the bold anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists, and guild socialists of yesteryear? What about a programme, as Tony Smythe suggests?

JAMES GILLESPIE

OBSERVATIONS ON ANARCHY 49:
AUTOMATION

I AM SO DELIGHTED WITH ANARCHY 49, particularly with George and Louise Crowley’s article “Beyond Automation”, that I have to write and say so. “If replacement of purblind instinct with reasoned confrontation of environment is the prime direction of human evolution, then with each progressive transformation of society we see accelerated the humanisation of homo sapiens.” This is Julian Huxley’s evolutionary humanism, shorn of its nonsense. It is almost devastating to see so perfectly expressed the essence of one’s own view, which is what this article does all through, so that I feel that all words of mine are wasted and that all I need to communicate is enclosed within those pages. And it is communication at a very low “noise level” (to borrow Alex Comfort’s phrase)—a minimum of ambiguity and of emotive associations.

Cambridge

JOAN HARVEY

OBSERVATIONS ON ANARCHY 48:
LORD OF THE FLIES

I THINK YOUR REVIEWERS IN ANARCHY 48, have not commented on some of the most important weaknesses of William Golding’s Lord of the Flies, and secondly, have omitted to mention strands of the book of interest to anarchists.

As a little story, it is gripping and convincing, as a piece of English it is fashioned with care and sensitivity (after four readings I am still excited by the way the language is used), but as an allegory it has glaring limitations. To point to the obvious, there are no females on the island. Why this may have appealed to Ballantyne, in writing Coral Island, and may appeal to Golding, it does not correspond with reality. There is no relationship of intense affection at all: maybe this is excusable, in view of the age of the participants, but a “microcosm” of the world which doesn’t take into account relations of love between folk is peculiarly inadequate.

Golding does give hints of love, which have been largely ignored by critics (I haven’t seen the film to know whether this includes them). The most striking is Jack’s jealousy: the chief motivation for his break with the social democrats is not his inherent savagery or even his choir-nurtured urge to be boss, but his jealousy and hatred of Piggy, whom he sees as supplanting himself in the counsels and affections of Ralph. Jack sees Ralph as his big brother, the friend who should praise him for having succeeded in hunting, who should consult with him, who should recognise his primacy in practical matters in return for his own recognition of Ralph’s intangible air of authority (that of the well-brought-up, good-class boy) which they all feel. But Ralph, Jack feels, rejects him, and his bitterness and viciousness are those of a child (or man) whose affection and need for affection have been snubbed. But the tie is very strong: when he does finally go, he has to tear out of himself the “No” with which he refuses to forgive Ralph.

Ralph, for his part, is not the paragon that eager liberal reviewers would like to think, even as they chafe at his unquestionable defeat. He is a cold child, accustomed to acceptance in a position of superiority; he has little interest in or appreciation of Piggy, initially, for he
has not the imagination to fathom people. The same lack of imagina-
tion leads him to completely unestimate the general fear of the Beast,
and blinds him to the intensity of Jack’s friendship. (He eventually
accepts Piggy’s intellectual and therefore unbalanced view of Jack, and
treats him with the tired reasonableness of an adult, of Piggy’s auntie.)
Even his democracy is an unimaginative, paper thing. Jack wins the
tribe partly because he offers them participation, even if only as in-
feriors. At the end, we identify with him because he is all we have
left on the Goody side, but he is a very inadequate Goody, and Simon
better represents the qualities Golding admires. It is Simon who for-
gives Jack, who has pity on Piggy, who adores Ralph, who tries to
show the tribe that their Fear is groundless, who sacrifices himself for
others. But Simon doesn’t try and ride on or direct society as Ralph
and Jack do: he feels what is true around him, and is then content
to be true to his own dictates, and to try to help individuals.
The Golding enters into his soul when he seems to be adding mentally all
the time, “but what’s the use”—yet he goes on following his own
‘natural’ way.

I would have thought there was more to interest anarchists in this
than in the self-destructive mechanisms of miniature states, especially
as the only hope Golding allows in the book comes from Simon, true
to himself to the end, and with beliefs not eroded and driven back as
are those of Ralph (who, at the finish, is using the stick on which hung
the Lord of the Flies) and Piggy (who refuses to face the implications
of his having taken part in Simon’s murder).

Golding is a pessimist, and a Christian, and therefore Simon’s
efforts come to nothing, and Simon is ceremonially killed. But if
anyone’s ethic is offered us as an alternative to the “Garrison State”,
it is Simon’s.

An anarchist may believe that Simon’s way—binding wounds in-
stead of giving them, committing oneself to people, instead of committing
them to someone else—strikes a chord in the human, as much as does
Jack’s (or, as it really is, Roger’s) way.

Rio de Janeiro

JONN ROE

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